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PERSPECTIVES ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
For more than 20 years, the issue of affirmative action has
spawned major legal and political battles. On October 14, 1997, The
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor found itself on the front lines
of those battles when the Center for Individual Rights (CIR) filed
suit in federal court on behalf of several White students who failed
to get into the undergraduate college.' In their complaint, the
plaintiffs charge the University with unconstitutional discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, claiming that they were not admitted as
result of the race-conscious admissions policy maintained by the
school.' On December 3, 1997 CIR filed another action against the
University of Michigan Law School on behalf of a White woman
who had similarly not been admitted to the Law School.3 The ad-
vent of these lawsuits sparked a range of responses among
members of the University of Michigan community. Law students
debated the issue, developed statements, and held press confer-
ences.4 Additionally, students brought in speakers and panels to
discuss, debate and explore affirmative action and related issues.
The student editors of the Michigan Journal of Race & Law were
among those who participated in this process, debating and
adopting a brief statement in support of the Law School's policy.
Other groups, like the Black Law Students Alliance, used the op-
portunity to research the issues and adopt statements of a more
comprehensive nature. In addition to preparing their own state-
ment,5 the Asian Pacific American Law Students Association took
the opportunity to incorporate the issue of affirmative action into
their symposium Rethinking Racial Divides: Asian Pacific Americans
and the Law, which took place on February 21, 1998. The Journal is
pleased to present these perspectives on affirmative action as ex-
amples of the intellectual activity around the topic taking place at
this law school.
1. See Complaint, Gratz v. Bollinger, Civ No. 97-75231 (E.D. Mich. filed Oct. 14,
1997).
2. See id. at 5-7.
3. See Complaint, Grutter v. Bollinger, Civ. No97-75928 (E.D. Mich. filed Dec. 3,
1997).
4. See, e.g., Rusty Hoover, U-M Law Students Step Up to Defend Affirmative Action
Policy, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 9, 1997, at Al. For a larger sampling of law student
opinion on the question of affirmative action, see Special Feature, Affirmative Action
Statements, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 205 (1998).
5. See Asian Pacific American Law Students Association, Statement Regarding
the Lawsuit Against the University of Michigan, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 217 (1998).
STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
In the United States, race is a fundamental part of everyone's
existence. To ignore a person's race is to deny his or her individual-
ity. Affirmative action acknowledges race and its role in American
society. By acknowledging the importance of race in furthering so-
cial equality, affirmative action redefines the concept of meritocracy
from one based on arbitrary measures to a more comprehensive
view of the individual. For this reason, the Michigan Journal of Race &
Law supports the University of Michigan Law School in its defense
of its affirmative action policy.
Our Journal was founded on the understanding that race is essen-
tial to a complete discussion of the law. As with most mainstream
legal institutions, discussion of the inherently intertwined nature of
race and law is marginalized on this campus. As aspiring legal
scholars and practitioners, we must understand the racial dynamics
that form the social and historical context in which fundamental
legal themes exist.
A complete legal education requires that students of all back-
grounds be afforded the opportunity to contribute to classroom
discussion. Affirmative action makes this possible by opening doors
to students who face institutionally imposed barriers to a legal edu-
cation. As a public institution that trains future lawyers, judges, and
policy makers, the Law School must remain open to students of
color and provide opportunities that historically have been denied
to them.
Adopted April 23, 1998
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL
BLACK LAW STUDENTS ALLIANCE
STATEMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The members of the Black Law Students Alliance of the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School ("BLSA") support affirmative action as
a result of our experience as African Americans. Race continues to
play a significant role in American life. Affirmative action attempts
to account for the historical exclusion of racial minorities and
women from society's resources and opportunities, an exclusion that
has impacts across generational lines. Not long ago, the doctrine of
"separate but equal" was used to exclude minorities from colleges
and universities solely on the basis of race.1 This exclusion was inte-
gral to the Jim Crow policies that relegated persons of African
descent to overwhelmingly resource-poor communities or to the
least desirable and rewarding opportunities in the white commu-
nity. While the legal basis of Jim Crow was repudiated by the efforts
of the civil rights movement, the racial attitudes that formed the
foundation of those policies and the institutions that developed
within it persist today.' The persistence of these attitudes and insti-
tutional forms creates quite different life experiences for Americans
on the basis of race.
The dynamics of the college and professional school admissions
process themselves suggest the need to take race into account
through an affirmative process. Institutions of higher education
use admissions criteria that tend to favor the wealthy, a group that
is disproportionately white.3 Additionally, the small number of
1. Between 1896 and 1954, the Supreme Court refused to overrule the doctrine
of "separate but equal" established in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S.
631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Gong Lum v. Rice,
275 U.S. 78 (1927); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
For a discussion of the rise and fall of the separate but equal doctrine within the
context of higher education, see JOHN A. HANNAH ET AL., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION 12-39 (1960).
2. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d
ed. 1974) (discussing the lasting economic and social effects of Jim Crow).
3. See ALLAN NAIRN, THE REIGN OF ETS: THE CORPORATION THAT MAKES UP
MINDS, 223-25 (1980) (discussing the correlation between family or household in-
come and LSAT performance among law school applicants); CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON
POLICY STUDIES IN HIGHER EDUC., SELECTIVE ADMISSSIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND TWO REPORTS 15 (1977); see also Deborah C.
Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1847,
1870-72 (1996); Eulius Sinien, The Law School Admission Test as a Barrier to Almost
Twenty Years of Affirmative Action, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 359, 375-78 (1986).
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minorities in the applicant pools4 necessitates taking race into ac-
count to achieve the societal and educational benefits that are
derived from a racially diverse student body. The history of racial
hostility on many university campuses, together with present ten-
sions, makes many institutions unattractive to the individual
minority applicant. Affirmative action helps create the critical mass
of diverse students necessary to provide minority applicants with a
sense not only that they will receive support in the institution's en-
vironment, but also that it is committed to their education and well
being. Creating this critical mass also actualizes the institution's
recognition that understanding and communicating with persons of
different racial backgrounds is an essential aspect of the education to
be received by all of its members.
Affirmative action recognizes the need to overcome the barriers
to full inclusion and the full use of the nation's human capital. One
sees this recognition reflected in the executive orders of Presidents
Truman through Nixon that have applied affirmative action to poli-
cies designed to promote racial inclusion.' Against this background
of government action, race-conscious admissions further the reme-
dial goal of alleviating socio-political inequality while fulfilling the
institutional purposes of colleges and universities.6 With this under-
standing, racial experiences become part of the measure of
determining who can best contribute to and utilize the higher educa-
tional process, and therefore merit admission to its rights, privileges,
and opportunities.
The influence of racial experience as a foundation for identity,
analysis, and conceptualization, makes a racially diverse student
body a necessity for high-quality university education. In its original
conception, the university was purely a training and credentialing
ground for individuals to achieve their predetermined station in
life.7 Under this view, those who were to benefit from college educa-
tion hailed from the wealthy class; new knowledge was to be
4. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST.
L.J. 669, 678-85 (1998) (discussing the small number of minorities in the applicant
pool seeking admission to the University of Texas Law School in the years leading
up to the Hopwood decision).
5. See generally MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE
SECOND RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1990 (2nd ed. 1991) (discussing
presidential treatment of affirmative action).
6. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
7. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge (1778),
reprinted in JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 372-78 (Merrill D. Peterson, ed. 1984); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr, (Sept. 7, 1814), reprinted in JEFFERSON, supra at 1222-
23.
[VOL. 4:189
Black Law Students Alliance
produced by an enlightened leisure class.8 As a nation, our vision of
the role and function of higher education has become significantly
broader, more populist, and more democratic. In stark contrast to
the old vision of higher education-providing those already certain
to become leaders by virtue of their wealth the necessary tools to
contribute to the nation through fulfillment of the responsibilities of
their inherited social office-we currently view education as a
means of both social mobility and the creation of enlightened lead-
9ers.
While colleges and universities continue to play a strong role in
helping people acquire knowledge and training in a particular area,
our society also has come to see developing new forms of knowl-
edge, as well as critically analyzing and rethinking traditional ideas
and systems of knowledge, as a crucial aspect of their mission. 10 A
diverse student body provides necessary support for these educa-
tional goals.
A university's mission of creating leaders must be considered in
the national and international context in which we live. Each school
seeks to create well-equipped leaders across a variety of communi-
ties. Thus, race-conscious affirmative action serves this diversity
purpose in the same way that geographically-conscious admissions
does.11 Bringing the bright and capable members of these different
communities together facilitates the development of leaders from
and for these communities, while providing the opportunity to de-
velop leaders adept at building bridges across the racial maginot
12line that separates us.
Race-conscious admissions is critical to the core educational
purposes of the University. A minority student's racial experiences
provide expertise necessary to assist non-minority students in de-
veloping the critical thinking and other skills necessary to succeed in
business or professional life. As we move into the twenty-first cen-
tury, success in business or a profession increasingly requires the
ability to analyze from many different perspectives. Minority students
will often interpret issues differently than their majority counterparts.
A critical mass of such students is necessary for two reasons: 1) such a
critical mass provides exposure to majority students of a broad range
8. See sources cited supra note 7.
9. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 93,
160 (1998).
10. See id. at 92-93.
11. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.); Robert S. Whitman, Affirmative Action on Campus: The Legal and Practical
Challenges, 24 J.C. & U.L. 637, 661 (1998).
12. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 9, at 220-24, 239.
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of experience they otherwise would not likely encounter, and 2)
exposure to talented minority students will enable others to see
members of these groups as individuals.13
One sees, therefore, that the value of a significant minority
presence at our institutions of higher education arises both from the
experience of minorities as members of disadvantaged groups and
from the value of the diversity that they contribute as individual
members of such groups. Both aspects of this process help to break
down racial stereotypes, thereby promoting the ability to profit from
difference. Consequently, a university requires an inclusive, racially
diverse student body to achieve its educational goals of professional
competence and the development of enlightened leaders.
In a similar way, racial diversity assists universities' efforts to
produce graduates adept at critical thinking. An idea's acceptance in
the marketplace of ideas depends upon its ability to adequately
address and prevail over competing alternatives.14 Modem scholar-
ship is richer and stronger now than it ever has been. This strength
results, in part, from the critical discourses that have been developed
as a result of student and academic activism. The development of
these discourses has paralleled the process of democratization and
increased minority inclusion in institutions of higher education
during this century. 5 Abandoning race-conscious admissions threat-
ens to substantially reduce the number of these individuals who can
contribute to this process, either as students or professionals.
Affirmative action is about opportunity, but it has only been
able to remedy the problem of disparity caused by racial discrimina-
tion to a certain extent. Affirmative action does not represent the
triumph of the incapable. Rather, it represents an opportunity for a
more diverse pool of persons to contribute their voices and talents to
the definition of "merit" or "qualified." Let us not waste time debating
whether race is a relevant consideration in university admissions.
Instead we should be having a discussion on the barriers to inclusion
in the university community of all those who will benefit from and
contribute to its purposes. The road of inclusion and expansion of
opportunity to disadvantaged communities is the only path to a just
and equitable society. Only when we reach that point will it be time
to discuss the question of colorblindness.
BLACK LAW STUDENTS ALLIANCE
University of Michigan Law School
13. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 9, at 229-30.
14. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
15. See PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM, THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND
THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 471 (1988).
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SYMPOSIUM:
RETHINKING RACIAL DIVIDES:
ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS AND THE LAW
While the dialogue on race in the United States has intensified
in recent years, this discussion remains focused primarily on the
relationship between Blacks and Whites. Consequently, this bipolar
dialogue often discounts the experiences of other racial and ethnic
minorities and marginalizes the issues facing these groups. Asian
Pacific Americans (APAs), in particular, have been subject to this
marginalization. Discussions of how APAs fit into the race debate
often center on squeezing APAs into the Black-White dichotomy
rather than confronting the distinctive issues posed by the APA com-
munity's history and experience.
To address some of these concerns and to broaden the discussion
on race to include this broader perspective, the Asian Pacific American
Law Students Association at the University of Michigan Law School
(APALSA) held its first symposium entitled "Rethinking Racial Di-
vides: Asian Americans and the Law" on February 20-21, 1998. The
Symposium gathered many prominent legal scholars to begin an ex-
amination of some of the challenges presently facing the APA
community. These two days of legal and social discourse provided a
dynamic forum for legal scholars and the more than 200 participants
to explore issues such as immigration, affirmative action, gender and
sexual orientation, and the future development of APA jurisprudence.
The panel addressing the role of APAs in the affirmative action debate
provided some of the most lively discussion during the Symposium.
Accordingly, APALSA and the Michigan Journal of Race & Law, are
proud to present portions of this panel discussion.
APALSA greatly appreciates the financial support of the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School, the Center for the Education of
Women, Office of Academic Multicultural Initiatives, Office of De-
velopment and Alumni Relations, Rackham Graduate School, South
Asian Network of Graduate Students at Michigan, Student Affairs
Programming Council, University of Michigan Business School,
University of Michigan Multi-Ethnic Student Affairs, University of
Michigan Programs for Educational Opportunity, University of Michi-
gan School of Public Policy, and the Diversity and Career Development
Committee of the University of Michigan Medical School.

SYMPOSIUM:
RETHINKING RACIAL DIVIDES-
PANEL ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Gabriel J. Chin*
Sumi K. Cho**
Marina C. Hsieh***
Deborah C. Malamud****
PROFESSOR MALAMUD: Organizing this conference has been only
one part of the activist social practice that the Asian Pacific Ameri-
can law student community has been involved in at Michigan this
year. The planning for this conference predates the now-pending
law suits against the University of Michigan Law School's affirma-
tive action program. And what that meant was that when the
lawsuits hit, the Asian Pacific American Law Students Association
(APALSA for short) was already activated and intellectually en-
gaged as a group and was in an ideal position to start addressing the
issues that affirmative action and the lawsuits raised for the Asian
American community. What APALSA needed to do was work very
hard, first and foremost, to decide what its stance ought to be as an
organization, to see whether there was enough consensus to even
have a stance as an organization. That became a central part of the
group's intellectual activity during the current academic year. I was
uniquely privileged to be a part of some of those discussions and
have leaned a great deal from the students. I will introduce the panel
by describing to you some of their debates.
First is the question of whether there is or ought to be a com-
mon Asian Pacific American standpoint on the issue of affirmative
action. The Asian Pacific community is internally diverse, and
there's a serious question as to whether its internal differences quite
legitimately ought to stand in the way of the creation of a single
Asian Pacific standpoint. One thinks of differences ranging from
country of origin, to generation of residence in the United States, to
* Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. B.A. 1985,
Wesleyan; J.D. 1988, Michigan; LL.M. 1995, Yale, E-mail: gchin@aya.yale.edu.
** Visiting Professor, University of Michigan Law School, Winter 1999; Associ-
ate Professor, De Paul University College of Law. B.A. 1984, University of California,
Berkeley; J.D. 1990, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall);
Ph.D. 1992, University of California, Berkeley (Ethnic Studies).
*** Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School
of Law. A.B. 1982, Harvard University; J.D. 1988, University of California, Berkeley.
**** Professor, University of Michigan Law School: B.A. 1977, Weslyan Univer-
sity; J.D. 1986, University of Chicago.
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location within the United States, and I'm sure our panelists will
think of many others.
Second, in working towards an Asian Pacific perspective on the
issue of affirmative action, one has to acknowledge that the answer
may be different depending on whether one is asking the question
from the point of view of self-interest or the point of view of altru-
ism. I'll take those one at a time and then I'll question the
distinction.
Where is the self-interest of the Asian Pacific community-
assuming it exists as a single community-when the issue is affirma-
tive action? Some people speak of Asian Pacific Americans as a
group still in need of affirmative action in education, in employ-
ment, or both. Some members of the Asian Pacific community see
Asian Pacific Americans as having a continuing need for affirmative
action across the board. Some see a need in the sphere of employ-
ment, but not particularly in the sphere of education. Others, who
see that as a possible distinction, think for strategic reasons that you
can't really draw the line-you're either for it or against it across the
board. On the other side of the debate entirely are those who see
Asian Pacific Americans as a "model minority" that is far more likely
to be injured by affirmative action. At least in the setting of elite
educational institutions, they are disturbed by the formal or infor-
mal anti-Asian quotas that often seem to crop up as part of diversity-
based affirmative action plans.
What about the place of altruism? What are we to do if we come
to the conclusion-or if you come to the conclusion as Asian Pacific
Americans-that affirmative action isn't particularly needed by or
helpful to the Asian Pacific community? What should Asian and
Pacific Americans think about affirmative action from a more pub-
licly minded standpoint? For many of the students with whom I
spoke in the course of the year, their political coming of age was
often a matter of beginning to identify with the community of color
in general and to shake of some of the negative stereotypes that
those in the parental or grand-parental generation might have had of
members of other communities of color in the United States. For
them, taking an altruistic stand on affirmative action is an act of
personal and political identity and defines the stance of the Asian
Pacific American community within the community of color in the
United States.
Some of the students in Michigan's Asian Pacific American
community came to question whether it even makes sense to make a
distinction between self-interest and altruism. This opens up onto a
broader discussion of whether Asian and Pacific Americans really
can stand apart from the community of color as they think about
their own interests. Can Asian and Pacific Americans in the United
[VOL. 4:195
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States escape their racialization? That question has been the subject
of interesting discussions within this building, at various student's
homes, and in the cafes of State Street. I am sure those discussions
will continue long after this conference ends.
We will now hear from a group of Asian Pacific American
scholars who are themselves taking leadership roles on issues of
affirmative action through their scholarship and practice.
Our first speaker will be Professor Gabriel Chin, or Jack Chin as
he prefers to be called. He is currently on the faculty of Western
New England College School of Law in Springfield, Massachusetts,
but is en route to becoming an Associate Professor at the University
of Cincinnati College of Law, effective this coming August. He is an
alum of this law school. He and I are also both undergraduate alums
of Wesleyan University, so it is my special pleasure to welcome him.
He has published extensively in the fields of equal protection,
immigration, and criminal law in addition to affirmative action.
With his talk we will have the opportunity to consider recent attacks
on affirmative action through litigation and populist initiatives.
PROFESSOR CHIN: Thank you, Deborah. I want to say, it's a real
pleasure to be back in Michigan for a couple of reasons. One is that
as an alum, you get to your call your former professors by their first
names. Hi Alex.1 Hi Chris.2 How are you doing?
See, that's really fun. But another reason is that in the 1985-86
school year, I was among a group of Asian American students3 who
started what was then known as the Asian American Law Students
Association. The most ambitious project that we accomplished back
then was a trip to Windsor for dim sum. So I take a great deal of
vicarious pride in what the students now are doing.
I'd like to talk with you about a piece that I'm working on. It's
called, "I'm Losing as Fast as I Can." My premise is that lawyers
litigating affirmative action cases and policy makers who deal with
affirmative action, particularly in the education context, have not
done a good job of protecting affirmative action.
As it has since the beginning, affirmative action has been very
controversial throughout the '80s and '90s. In the '80s and '90s,
every term, or every other term, there has been a case in the Su-
preme Court involving some form of affirmative action. But there
1. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center.
2. Christina Brooks Whitman, Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University
of Michigan Law School.
3. The other founders of what is now APALSA included Fred Bismonte '88,
Linda Kim Burakoff '88, 11 Y. Byun '87, Earl Lui '86, Steven Merino '87, Richard Tom
'85, and John Yamamoto '88.
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have been no Supreme Court cases in the education context since
Bakke4 in 1978. There have been a handful of lower court cases since
then, but they've been mostly odd, obscure cases that didn't really
call Bakke into question in any serious respect.
5
Now, of course, there are a number of factors that make sup-
porters of affirmative action worry: an increasingly hostile Supreme
Court; organized public opposition to affirmative action, reflected in
things like Proposition 209 ; more and better White litigants willing
to challenge affirmative action;7 and the complexities of dealing with
non-White, non-Black people, as reflected in the case at the Univer-
sity of Maryland 8 that involved a Latino plaintiff challenging a
scholarship program reserved for African American students. None-
theless, I think that inexplicable litigation decisions by defendants in
affirmative action cases are among the most important reasons that
affirmative action in education is presently at risk
I think that one of the most serious threats to affirmative action
is presented by people who are supposed to be its supporters. There
are two primary ways that I see this happening. One is that policy
makers who create educational affirmative action programs have
reserved to themselves the right to decide who is going to be in-
cluded in affirmative action, even when the justification is diversity.
4. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See generally Gab-
riel J. Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM & MARY BILL OF
RIGHTS J. 881 (1996), reprinted in 3 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 129-
95 (Gabriel J. Chin ed., 1998) (criticizing implementation of the Bakke decision and its
diversity rationale).
5. See Chin, Bakke to the Wall, supra note 4, at 924 n.184 (citing Doherty v. Rut-
gers Sch. of Law-Newark, 651 F.2d 893, 900 (3d Cir. 1981) (denying standing to White
plaintiff whose LSAT score and grade point average were below those of minority
candidates admitted under affirmative action program)); McAdams v. Regents of the
Univ. of Minn., 508 F. Supp. 354, 357, 359 (D. Minn. 1981) (granting summary judg-
ment for defendant law school because even if the university had no affirmative
action program, plaintiff would not have been admitted and therefore lacked rem-
edy).
6. The California Civil Rights Initiative was passed by voters in 1996 and elimi-
nated consideration of race or gender in state decisionmaking, including university
admissions. For an in-depth discussion of Proposition 209, see Neil Gotanda, Failure
of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity and the California Civil Rights Initiative, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135 (1996). A similar ballot measure, Initiative 200, recently
passed in Washington State. See David Postman & Barbara A. Serrano, Big Victories
for Murray and 1-200, SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 4, 1998, at Al.
7. See, e.g., Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F. 3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998), Hopwood v. Texas,
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) rev'g 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994); Gratz v. Bollinger,
Civ. No. C-97-75231 (E.D. Mich. filed Oct. 14, 1997); Smith v. University of Wash.
Law Sch., 2 F. Supp.2d 1324 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (decision granting in part and deny-
ing in part motion for class certification).
8. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), rev 'g, 838 F. Supp. 1075
(D. Md. 1993) (rejecting challenge brought by Latina/o student to scholarship pro-
gram limited to African American students).
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And what that means, particularly, is that a number of institutions
have insisted that Asian American people-as well as other racial
groups, but primarily Asian Americans-do not contribute to diver-
sity at an institution. The second problem is that many of these
institutions don't seem to take the law-the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in affirmative action cases-particularly seriously. The
Hopwood9 case is a prime example.
In Hopwood, as I'm sure you all know, the University of Texas
Law School's affirmative action program was challenged and the
University of Texas lost." This is an important case. This is a critical
transition. Bakke was injured. Bakke was bloodied in that case and it
changed the landscape. Even now, opponents of affirmative action
look at Hopwood as the beginning of the end-the case that led to the
downfall of educational affirmative action.
The University of Texas Law School justified their affirmative
action program largely on the basis of promoting diversity." There
were a couple of interesting features of that policy. One is that they
had a two-track admissions process; separate admissions commit-
tees for minorities and for other people who weren't in their
diversity program, their special admissions program. 2 The other
feature of the policy was that it assisted only Chicanas/os and Afri-
can Americans. 3 Only Chicanas/os and African Americans were
considered "diversifying" at the University of Texas Law School.
The problem with both of these aspects of Hopwood is that they
had been held illegal in Bakke. 14 Since then, I can think of nothing in
subsequent Supreme Court cases that would have made it appear
that either of those features would be constitutional. Even the con-
curring judge in the 5th Circuit-the one who rejected the idea that
affirmative action is unconstitutional, and who defended affirmative
action and thought the majority had gone too far-thought that the
Texas policy was unconstitutional.'
The judge said,
Blacks and Mexican Americans are but two among any
number of racial or ethnic groups that could and
9. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'g, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D.
Tex. 1994) (rejecting challenge to law school admissions policy by unsuccessful
White applicants).
10. Id.
11. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570.
12. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 939; 861 F. Supp. at 558-59, 562, 578-79.
13. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936 (citing 861 F. Supp. at 563 (noting targets of 10%
for Mexican American students, and 5% of African American students)).
14. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315, 317 (1978).
15. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962 (Weiner, J., concurring).
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presumably should contribute to genuine diversity. By
singling out only those two ethnic groups, the initial
stage of the law school's... admissions process ignored
altogether non-Mexican Hispanic Americans, Asian
Americans, and Native Americans, to name but a few.
16
How could this have happened? How could it have happened
that a policy that was so obviously flawed from the beginning be-
came effective at the University of Texas? I'm willing to bet that the
faculty at that school made sure that their employment contracts
were drafted in such a way that they would be legally enforceable.
I'm even willing to bet that the faculty of that law school-even the
most senior faculty-made sure that they got their text book orders
for the next semester into the book store by the date imposed by the
dean. Yet they treated law school affirmative action so casually-as
so trivial, so unimportant-that they couldn't come up with a pro-
gram that was even arguably legal. As soon as Texas was sued, they
abandoned the program because there was no question that it was
unlawful.
They didn't just make strange policy decisions, they made
strange litigation decisions as well. Texas chose to defend their pro-
gram on the merits. I understand that the University of Texas had
the opportunity to settle the Hopwood case in exchange for admitting
the four named plaintiffs in the suit and paying the attorney's fees.
Now as a law school professor, I'd have no way of knowing this
myself, but I understand that real lawyers, when faced with tactical
choices, ask themselves, "How can this help me? How can this hurt
me?"
The best-case scenario for Texas, the most wildly successful
thing they could have hoped for, as that they wouldn't have to pay
the other side's attorney fees and they wouldn't have to admit the
White plaintiffs. The concern of avoiding copycat litigation didn't
exist in this case because they changed their admissions program. So
winning on the merits in this case wouldn't insulate their new pro-
gram and losing to the Hopwood plaintiffs wouldn't impeach it.
So Texas had virtually nothing to gain, but they didn't want to
let those four White applicants in. They won in the district court by
persuading the judge that just because a person has been subjected
to unconstitutional discrimination doesn't mean they should win
their case. Texas persuaded the district court that the plaintiffs
should also have to prove that not only were they discriminated
against, but that the discrimination was consequential. 7 That is to
16. Id. at 966.
17. See Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 579-z80.
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say, they would have gotten the thing at issue, but for the unlawful
discrimination.
The problem was that the Supreme Court had previously held
that once a plaintiff proves unconstitutional discrimination, the
burden shifts to the discriminator to show that the decision would
have been the same even in the absence of that unlawful discrimina-
tion."'
Texas said that that rule no longer applied. Texas said that that
principle was gone. So if a person were interviewed for a job and
told "Sorry, we don't hire Blacks, so go away," the Plaintiff would
have to prove not only that that policy was illegal, which it surely is,
but also that they would have been hired had they been White. They
said current rule was out the window.
There were two problems with the Law School's argument in
the district court. First, in my view, it was doctrinally nonsensical.
The Supreme Court had established these rules in a line of cases that
has never been overruled. 19 And second, thank God the Supreme
Court hasn't overruled those cases. For opponents of discrimination,
this is a good rule, not a bad one. The discriminator should bear the
burden. But Texas persuaded the district court that the rule had
changed, and at that great cost, Texas didn't have to issue the four
admissions letters.
Again, at that stage, rather than mooting or settling the case,
they suffered an appeal. In my view, there was no way that Texas
could expect to win that appeal on the procedural ground and win-
ning would have been a disaster. Getting the Fifth Circuit to adopt
that rule would have been a disaster. At this point, there was really
nothing in it for them. They were going to have to pay attorneys'
fees and they were going to have to bear the burden of proving that
these applicants would not have been admitted under a constitu-
tional system.
I've spoken to some of the lawyers on both sides of this case.
I've read the trial transcript and the briefs on appeal and I don't
understand why Texas let this appeal proceed. It can't have been the
money; they hired Vinson and Elkins, a very expensive, very repu-
table law firm to represent the Law School. It can't have been the
principle, because the principle against shifting the burden once
unconstitutional discrimination has been proven is a bad one. The
only explanation I can think of for their conduct is that this was
recreational litigation.
18. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (using burden shifting rule in dis-
cussing damages); Mt. Healthy City Bd. Of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
(invoking the burden shifting rule).
19. See, e.g., Carey, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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They seem to have thought to themselves: "It's a neat case. It's
exciting. It's a constitutional case and maybe it's going to go to the
Supreme Court." I don't think they asked the lawyer's question,
"How does this help me? How does this hurt me?" And I really
don't think they took into account the consequences on the indi-
viduals whose lives are changed by the availability of affirmative
action and how this could hurt them. There's an old legal saying,
"Let justice be done though the Heavens fall."20 But what Texas did
was, "Let justice be done though the Heavens fall on you."
Texas put the educational opportunities, and in many ways, the
lives of people of color on the line for no good reason that I can see. I
think Texas should have followed another maxim in this case: "She
who fights and runs away lives to fight another day."
Unfortunately, as many of you know, there's a very similar suit
by the same conservative legal group in Washington-the Center for
Individual Rights-against the University of Michigan Law School.2'
Tragically, I think there's a risk that the Michigan suit is going to
replay along similar lines because Michigan has put itself in a very
difficult situation.
In 1992, the faculty at the Michigan Law School adopted a bul-
letproof affirmative action program. It's completely legal, assuming
that Bakke is still good law. It's as defensible as an affirmative action
plan could possibly be. It's what Justice Powell endorsed in Bakke,2
only better. Unfortunately, from what I can see, the Law School
failed to follow one of the primary rules applicable to CYA memos.
And that is you've got to at least appear to follow it going forward.
Michigan didn't do that.
One way Michigan failed to follow the memo is that even after
1992, when it changed what, in my humble opinion, was a patently
illegal policy, 23 a Hopwood-style policy, it continued some of the
problems of the previous policy.
When I was a student here ten years ago we looked at the
documents. And in 1975, when there were little more than a thou-
sand Asian Pacific American law students in the entire United
20. Calambro v. Second Judicial Court of Nev., 964 P. 2d 794, 805, (Springer, J.
dissenting) (quoting Rex v. Wilkes, 4 J. Burrow 289 (K.B. 1770)).
21. See Grutter v. Bollinger, Civ. No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich. filed Dec. 3, 1997).
22. In Bakke, Justice Powell's controlling opinion included, as an appendix, the
affirmative action plan of Harvard College, which he identified as an example of the
kind of program which would pass muster. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 321-24 (1978). Because it has already received judicial approval, this
kind of plan may have the best chance of being sustained by the Supreme Court.
23. See Chin, supra note 4.
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States-out of more than 100,000 total24 -the faculty at Michigan
Law School decided that there were enough Asian American law
students at Michigan and that there were enough Asian American
lawyers in the community.2i Therefore, they specifically decided not
to include Asian Americans in the affirmative action program at
Michigan.26
Since then, Michigan has continued to have a racially selective
affirmative action admissions program, so far as I can see. In the
1995 to 1997 University of Michigan Law School Bulletin, they say,
Michigan recognizes the public interest in increasing
the number of lawyers from groups which the faculty
identifies as significantly underrepresented in the legal
profession. In particular, we strongly encourage pro-
spective students who are African American, Mexican
American, Native American or Puerto Rican and raised
on the U.S. mainland to apply.
27
This is the same language from the 1975 policy which was not
substantively changed after Bakke.28 And I think that catalog policy is
going to have some of the same problems as the program in Hop-
wood.
There are a number of reasons that the Supreme Court may not
be crazy about that kind of policy. First, how can any faculty, the
University of Texas Law School Faculty, for example, decide that
Mexican Americans are in, but Native Americans are out? How can
24. See ABA SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, A
REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, FALL 1984, at 66, 68 (1985). By
objecting to the exclusion from diversity and other special admissions programs of
Asian Pacific Americans and other non-African American, non-Whites, I certainly do
not mean to deny or minimize the history of discrimination against African Ameri-
cans. However, I also believe that other aspects of racism in American law should
not be overlooked. See, Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimina-
tion and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1 (1998)
(describing anti-Asian bias in American immigration law); Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy
Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA LAW REVIEW 151 (1996) (arguing
that Justice Harlan expressed racist attitudes with respect to Chinese immigrants).
25. Admissions Policy-Special Admissions, University of Michigan Law School
2 (adopted May 16, 1975) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1975 policy].
26. Id.
27. 25 UNIV. OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL BULLETIN 1995-1997, at 81 (1995)
[hereinafter BULLETIN].
28. Compare 1975 Policy, supra note 25 (justifying special admissions policy inter
alia on "recognition that these groups have been substantially underrepresented in
the student body and the legal profession") with Admissions Guidelines, University
of Michigan Law School 3 (Sept. 7, 1978) (on file with author) ("[T]he presence of a
substantial number of minorities in the student body is important to the educational
environment of the school and to increasing minority representation at the bar.").
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they do that on a fair basis? How do they know? Do they know the
history and culture and the situation of each group? Have they thor-
oughly considered all the arguments? It's a Solomonic decision that,
again, in my humble opinion, no law school faculty in America is
prepared to make on a really careful and intelligible basis.
Second, Michigan's policy also strikes me as inconsistent with
Bakke. Bakke held an affirmative action program unconstitutional
because it was limited to race and didn't take into account diversity
factors beyond race.29 This one is even more limited than that. It just
takes into account some races as contributing to diversity. I don't
think that's going to fly.
Another defect in the Michigan program, at least as reflected in
this bulletin, is its avowed goal. The 1992 memo talks about affirma-
tive action strictly for diversity purposes, which is safe, given that
it's the only compelling interest the Supreme Court has recognized
in this context to date-at least where there's no proven history of
discrimination. But they haven't stuck to that story. The catalog talks
about building the bar, building communities of lawyers outside the
law school context.30 And I think that's a risk. Justifying affirmative
action simply on the ground that it increases the number of minority
professionals was rejected by the Supreme Court in Bakke and it's
been rejected by the federal courts several times since then.31
Now there's no question in my mind that the Supreme Court
was wrong when they limited affirmative action in that way,32 but
what schools like Texas-and hopefully not Michigan-realized too
late is that it's not an academic question. The justifications and ra-
tionales for affirmative action are no longer an academic, intellectual
question, they also must be evaluated in the context of what the
courts are going to permit because, whether we like it or not, any
affirmative action program that is questionable is going to be the
subject of litigation.
My tentative thought is that just as Texas was the wrong party,
at the wrong time, to take this issue to the Supreme Court, Michigan
is the wrong party, at the wrong time to defend affirmative action on
this ground. I can just hear Justice Scalia's questions now: "The pro-
fessors at one of the finest law schools in the United States couldn't
understand and apply Bakke, but you want us to treat it as a work-
29. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978).
30. See BULLETIN, supra note 27.
31. See Chin, Bakke to the Wall, supra note 4, at 886 n.20.
32. The reasons for my support of affirmative action are set out in a recent arti-
cle. See Gabriel J. Chin et al., Beyond Self-Interest: Asian Pacific Americans Toward a
Community of Justice, A Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action (last updated Oct. 21,
1996) (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://merton.sscnet.ucla.edu/aasc/policy/>, reprinted
in 3 UCLA ASIAN-PAC. AM. L.J. (forthcoming 1999).
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able rule? You thought that the rule of Bakke was so compelling and
so valuable that you ignored it for decades, but now you think we
should uphold it?"
My initial reaction is that Michigan, in this situation, should do
what Texas should have done: find a way to make the case go away.
I see that my time is up so I'll stop. Thank you.
PROFESSOR MALAMUD: We will, of course, have plenty of time
for questions and comments. I'm sure that Jack's talk, in particular,
has stimulated some desire to respond immediately, but those aren't
the ground rules that we set, so we will rigidly stick with them de-
spite the circumstances.
I'm particularly pleased to introduce Marina Hsieh to you as
our next speaker. She's on the faculty of Berkeley's Law School and
will be speaking to us from the point of view of the California expe-
rience.
I have known Marina for 11 years, I figured out, much to both
of our mutual shock. For those of you who are current students or
recent alums and have gone through the clerkship process, take note
of this: Marina and I have been friends and colleagues since she
interviewed with Hon. Louis H. Pollak the year that I was clerking
for him, and she immediately got the job. We were, from that mo-
ment on, looking for Marina's co-clerk, and I think Judge Pollak is
probably going to be doing that for the rest of his career.
She, in her scholarship, has been involved in civil procedure is-
sues -and civil rights issues more broadly. Her contributions in the
affirmative action field have been important ones from an activist
standpoint. She was a litigator for a number of years with the
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. before going into
law teaching and is currently-let me get the title right-the North-
ern California Affiliate Representative and an Affirmative Action
Committee Member of the ACLU. And the ACLU, as any of you
who are Mark Rosenbaum's33 students know, has been taking a
leading role in fighting, losing, and continuing to fight Proposition
209.
Marina.
PROFESSOR HSIEH: I, too, am very excited to be here. I think it's
fascinating to watch Asian Pacific American law students across the
country begin to grapple with these issues, to frame them, to try to
stay ahead of their inevitable involvement in these issues of affirma-
tive action and race politics. I say "inevitable" because I think that,
33. Visiting Professor, University of Michigan Law School, Winter 1997-1999;
Director, ACLU of Southern California.
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whether we want to be there or not, we will be part of the dialogue
and debate. We will be used. We will be assuming roles in the racial
politics debates, whether we define them ourselves or are cast into
them, and so it's exciting to be here.
My talk was tentatively titled-and I think this now fits quite
well-"After the Loss: The Report from California." It's just a little
preview of what might be your grim future. Sorry. I brought the rain
from California, and I also am going to bring the news of what's
going on there. It's stunning just to watch what's happening; you
keep thinking the next thing can't happen, but it does.
I'm going to ask the question of what's happening in California
in the post-Proposition 209 era from a few perspectives. First, what's
been happening in the state generally since the vote? Next, I'll ask
that question in terms of public law schools, specifically Boalt Hall.
(I call it the epicenter of the crisis.) Finally, what has been the effect
on lawyers and Asian Pacific Americans? Obviously I'll touch only
briefly on the answers to some of these very broad questions.
First, a bit of background. As you know, Proposition 209-
which barred any form of preference on the basis of race, ethnicity,
national origin, sex, and so on, in the areas of education, public em-
ployment, and public contracting-was passed by the state of
California in November 1996. 4 That vote was fairly overwhelming-
54% to 46% 35-there was a lot of daylight between those votes.
Polls suggested that Asian Pacific Americans, at least in urban
areas, did substantially oppose the passage of Proposition 209. Those
polls, conducted after the fact, suggested that there had been some
movement in the opinions of Asian Pacific Americans in California
during the campaign that preceded Proposition 209. There was ini-
tially some worry about how much various minority groups,
particularly Asians, might embrace an anti-209 posture) 6 In fact, all
34. Proposition 209 provides, in relevant part, "The state shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting." CAL. CONST., art. I, § 31 (as amended Nov.
5, 1996).
35. 4,736,180 votes were cast in favor of the initiative, and 3,986,196 were cast in
opposition. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1494
(N.D.Cal. 1996), vacated, 122 F. 3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 17 (1997).
36. In an Asian Week poll conducted between June 25 and July 2, 1996, Asian
American registered voters supported Proposition 209 by a 3-to-i margin; by the first
week of October (1-8), a Field poll showed Asian Pacific American voters evenly
divided at 41% for and 41% against, with the remaining 18% undecided. See Bert
Eljera, Equal Access or Discrimination?, ASIAN WEEK, Oct. 24, 1996, at 12; Annie
Nakao, Asians Deeply Divided over Affirmative Action, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 22, 1996, at
Cl. On the eve of the vote, the University of California Berkeley's Institute of Gov-
ernmental Studies polled non-White voters in proportion to their social and
economic standing in the state, revealing that 53% of California's Asians opposed the
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minority groups wound up voting against the passage of Proposi-
tion 209, 37 but obviously it still passed.
Proposition 209 was a popular initiative. California is, after all,
the land of democratic rule, the land of Constitutional Amendment
by popular vote. It's the state that brought us the already infamous
Proposition 187, for example, and is getting ready to bring us
"reform" of bilingual education by ballot. Elsewhere, Washington's
Initiative 200, which will similarly alter affirmative action in the
State of Washington, is pending,38 while another affirmative action
initiative was recently defeated in the City of Houston.39 Similarly,
Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution prohibiting recognition
of anti-gay discrimination under state law was passed by initiative.0
proposition. Seth Rosenfeld & Scott Winokur, Prop. 209 Divisive, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov.
3, 1996, at Cl.
37. The racial breakdown of the vote was:
Yes No
White: 63% 37%
Black: 26% 74%-
Latina/o: 24% 76%
Asian: 39% 61%
Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1494 (N.D.Cal.
1996), vacated, 122F. 3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 17 (1997).
38. Like Prop 209, the Washington initiative combined anti-affirmative action
language with anti-discrimination language: "The state shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting." Initiative 200, sec. 1(1). WASHINGTON
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE'S VOTER SERVICES DiviSION, STATE OF WASHINGTON
VOTERS PAMPHLET 30 (18th ed. 1998). Cf. source cited supra note 34. Unlike Prop. 209,
1-200 only has the force and effect of a state statute. See id. (stating that if passed, the
initiative would add a new section to RCW 49.60). 1-200 was passed by a majority of
voters on November 3, 1998. See Tom Brune, Now that 1-200 is Law, What's Next? UW
Alters Admission Policy, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at Al.
39. Houston's Proposition A, which was defeated 54%-46% on November 4, 1997
asked voters to decide the following issue: "Shall the charter of the city of Houston
be amended to end the use of affirmative action for women and minorities in the
operation of city of Houston employment and contracting, including ending the
current program and similar programs in the future?" Ron Nissimov, Affirmative
Action Case Will Be Heard: Texas Supreme Court to Look at Ballot Language, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Feb. 5, 1999, at A29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This language differed from the petition originally circulated. The original pe-
tition proposed: "The City of Houston shall not discriminate against, or grant
preferential treatment to any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color,
ethnicity or national origin in the operation of public employment and public con-
tracting." Id. The change in language prompted the original circulator of the petition
to sue the City of Houston. Id. The Texas Supreme Court is scheduled to hear argu-
ments in the case on April 8, 1999. Id.
40. Colorado's Amendment 2 prohibited state actors from enacting or enforcing
any policy granting "preferences, protected status or claim[s] of discrimination" on
the basis of homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation. COLO. CONST., art. II, § 30b.
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It's significant that this is a political decision, not a court decision,
that we are faced with in California.
By the way-an aside that some of you have heard me speak
about before-when we say the Supreme Court denied review of the
9th Circuit decision that upheld the constitutionality of 209, it is
important to read behind the news stories. I'm sure some of you
have picked up the newspapers and asked, "What exactly was the
legal challenge to 209?" The case was not primarily about affirmative
action, although that's hard to realize. I suspect that most people
reading the newspaper don't see, first, that the Court in the 209 case
merely denied review. People mistakenly interpret the news stories
to mean that the Supreme Court has decided the constitutionality of
affirmative action bans like California's. While such denials do have
the effect of binding the parties in the case, and creating procedural
authority within that circuit, the broader interpretation is not, of
course, what a mere denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court
means. 41 Second, people also read the stories to mean that the courts
have held that affirmative action is no longer constitutional.
The Constitutional argument made in 209 was much more sub-
tle. It has more serious implications for us. The argument is that the
political power-the participatory access-of minorities in the state
of California is constrained by this constitutional amendment. The
political access of groups that support affirmative action legislation
is unequally constrained because the amendment bars any kind of
program allowing affirmative action.
So, for example, if the quarter of the population of San Fran-
cisco that is Chinese wanted their supervisors to implement a
program of affirmative action for minority contractors for the City
and County of San Francisco, it would no longer be constitutional
after Proposition 209. Veterans, on the other hand, could go to their
local supervisors and pass the exact same type of preferential pro-
gram in contracting, without the constitutional constraint that is
imposed on race-based affirmative action supporters. That inequal-
ity is the 14th Amendment violation claimed in the case, and there is
In striking down this Amendment, the Supreme Court stated, A law declaring that in
general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek
aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most
literal sense." Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).
41. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 1698-99 (4th ed. 1996). But see Peter Linzer, The Meaning of
Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1229 (1979) (concluding that the court
denies certiorari most often when the majority of the justices agree with the decision
of the lower court). My own view follows that of Justice Stevens: decisions denying
certiorari have no bearing on the merits of the case. See Equality Found. of Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998) (opinion of Stevens, J. respecting
denial of certiorari).
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a good line of Supreme Court precedent, starting in the 1960's (that
still technically stands), that establishes that unequal access to reme-
dies can unconstitutionally restrict political participation by
protected groups."
That is the constitutional argument that the Ninth Circuit found
was not viable and that the Supreme Court chose not to review. I
think that this substantive decision about political access should be
more disturbing to us, as Asian Pacific Americans, than a negative
court holding on the issue of affirmative action. We will not be pow-
erful political actors-in terms of being able to control a whole state
or these major initiatives-for quite a long time. Failure to recognize
and to explore the meaning of equal political participation by mi-
norities will therefore affect us for a much longer time and to a
greater degree than some of these more headline-grabbing issues.
So what, besides the Constitutional challenge, has been hap-
pening in the state since the vote? You may have heard that there's a
counter-initiative circulating. Ron Takaki at UC Berkeley drafted a
nice, short statement that could be a counter-initiative. There's also
language that Berkeley students, including a tremendous number of
Asian Pacific American students, have drafted, which would reverse
Proposition 209 in just the educational area. 3 I think the odds are
quite low that it will have any realistic chance of making the No-
vember 1998 ballot. It costs a tremendous amount of money to get
the qualifying signatures, and, frankly, I think that the polls and the
voting would go the same way.
Why do I say that? I read the other day in the "Comical," that is
the San Francisco Chronicle, that a recent poll of Californians said they
actually are very happy.44 The economy is better; that, of course,
makes everyone happy. But we're also very happy because in Cali-
fornia, we think we're in a state that makes the right kinds of
42. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Washington v. Seattle School
District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). See also Vikram Amar & Evan Caminker, Equal
Protection, Unequal Political Burdens, and the CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019
(1996).
43. The initiative, circulated by Students for Educational Opportunity, stated, "In
order to provide equal opportunity, promote diversity, and combat discrimination in
public education, the state may consider the economic background, race, sex, ethnic-
ity, and national origin of qualified individuals." See Students for Educational
Opportunity (visited Feb. 14, 1999) <http://www.hotbed.com/eeoi.htm>. This posi-
tion was filed with the California Secretary of State's office, but failed to garner
enough signatures to qualify for the November 1998 ballot. Robert Selna, Berkeley
Students Seek Vote to Regain Racial Consideration in Admission, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL
SENTINEL, Oct. 11, 1998, at 29.
44. Carla Marinucci, Californians on Cloud 9, Survey Says, S.F. CHRONICLE, Feb. 12,
1998, at A21 (citing Field poll in which a majority believe California is heading in the
"right direction," the first time in almost a decade of annual polls that this positive
vote outnumbered those choosing the "wrong track").
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decisions, while the rest of the country is out of sync with
California.4 Between the lines of that poll, I read that the state that
brought us Proposition 187 (against immigrants) and Proposition
209 (against affirmative action) is perfectly happy doing exactly
what it did. The state that brought us "three strikes" thinks that it's
doing the right thing.
Pete Wilson has spun this phenomenon to send the message
that he is the 'progressive' from the West: I see the future. I'm the
leader for the new millennium. He wants to spread that joy across
the country. I think he knows that Californians really do think that
this is the better way to go.
Here's the nasty underside of that polling. It's not from this
poll, but some of the "good guys," as I would call them, have done
some very subtle polling in the post-Proposition 209, post-"Zero
African Americans at Berkeley" headline era of public education in
California. Some of that polling, which has not been publicly re-
leased, suggests that Californians are happier than ever with
Proposition 209. Some people assume that, in the aftermath of 209,
"we're shocked, simply shocked, to see what this really means.
Gosh, we didn't mean to do that." This assumption does not appear
to be true. Were we to have the vote again today, it looks like those.
who voted for Proposition 209 would do so again and they might
even gain some who voted against it originally who are now wa-
vering. That is a sobering thought. I believe it is also part of why you
don't see major dollars flowing from the obvious left organizations
to back those counter-initiatives: if they would fail anyway, it's bet-
ter not to replay the defeat on a grander scale.
So much for the doom and gloom. What's to come? You might
have heard about the English for the Children Initiative, the so-
called "Unz Initiative," that's pending in California. It would replace
bilingual education with one-year English language immersion
classes. It is a very complicated initiative, and it will be on the bal-
lot. 6 Its effects could be amazing: two-thirds of Asian and PacificS47
Islanders in the United States are foreign-born, and 40% of Asian
Pacific American children in California are "limited-English profi-
45. Id.
46. Proposition 227 passed with 61% of the vote on June 2, 1998. David R. Baker,
Prop. 227 Wins; Bilingual Ed Revision OK'd in Landslide, L.A. DAILY NEwS, June 3,
1998, at Ni; Nanette Asimov, Prop. 227 Challenged in Lawsuit, S.F. CHRONICLE, June 4,
1998, at Al.
47. Majority of APAs New Arrivals, Census Says, ASIAN WEEK, Sept. 1, 1995, at 1
(discussing Census data).
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cient. 4 1 Obviously an initiative like Unz's will have an huge impact
on the Asian population. It is just another example of the impact that
this popular, majoritarian initiative process will have upon us.
Moving on, what has been the effect of Proposition 209 on pub-
lic schools? Switch from the broad state of happy California and
telescope directly in to Boalt Hall. The Regents of the University of
California had already ordered the University to get rid of all of
race-based factors before Proposition 209.49 As a result, we had some
numbers earlier than we would have had from implementing 209.
Under the Regents' order, the first entering class to the UC Davis
Medical School-the school that brought us Bakke, 5° -had no African
Americans in it."1 Boalt Hall followed suit, and the class that entered
in 1997 included only one African American. 5 He was a deferral
from the year before, admitted under the old admissions policy. No
Blacks at all entered through the new 1997 admissions process.
Here are some of the numbers behind the headlines. I think they
speak for themselves. The 90% of the class that entered in 1997 that
was admitted under the new, post-209, post-Regents admissions
policy (as opposed to totals diluted by transfers and deferred admit-
tees) was 84% Non-Hispanic White. Of the 16% of minorities, 13%
were "Asian Pacific Islander." This breaks into two categories: 11%
were "Asians:" 21 Chinese, seven Korean and four Japanese
48. Victoria Lee-Jerrems & Ellen Wu, A Crude Way to Teach Asian Paci~fc Ameri-
cans English, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1998, at M6 (reporting on 1997 Language Census
data for California public schools).
49. See Adoption of Resolution: Policy Ensuring Equal Treatment-Admissions,
Minutes of University of California Board of Regents 27 (Jul. 20, 1995); see also Re-
gents of the University of California, Regents Briefing July 19-21, 1995 (visited Mar. 1,
1999) <http://www.ucop.edu/ucophome/comnserv/regjul95.html>; Amy Wallace
& Dave Lesher, UC Regents, In Historic Vote, Wipe Out Affirmative Action; Diversity:
Decision Signals End of California's National Leadership in Opening Top Universities to
Minorities. Jesse Jackson, Who Led Protest Against Rollback at Meeting, Says It Casts a
"Long Shadow", L.A. TIMES, Jul. 21, 1995, at Al.
50. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
51. OFFICE OF THE PRES. OF THE UNIV. OF CAL., TABLE ON ACADEMIC AD-
VANCEMENT (Oct. 17, 1996) (compiled from submissions by the Association of
American Medical Colleges, campus submissions, and UCLA). The University of
California at Davis Medical School not only had no Black matriculants, but no
American Indian/Alaska Natives or mainland Puerto Ricans. Id. The two Mexican-
American/Chicana/o matriculants were the only "underrepresented" students in the
entering class of 93 total students. Id. At the University of California at Irvine Medi-
cal School, only 3 of 92 matriculants entering in 1996 were from underrepresented
minorities. Id.
52. The University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall), 1997
Annual Admissions Report 3.
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id.
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students. Two percent were what Berkeley calls "Asian Subgroups:"
five Vietnamese/others, one Pacific Islander, and zero Filipinas/os.
55
So certain racial and ethnic categories at Boalt Hall were
"zeroed out." Filipinas/os zeroed out from about nine per class in
previous years to zero-zero admits leading to zero students. In the
entering class admitted under the new system, there were zero Na-
tive Americans as well. And of course, the most publicized, zero
African Americans (despite 15 offers, a terrific drop in the previous
number of African American admits).,6
Aside from Asian Pacific American admits, who else was in that
16% of the class that was minority? No African Americans. No Na-
tive Americans. The three percent balance was Latinas/os and
Chicanas/os. Like African Americans, this was also a huge drop
from previous years. Increasingly, the minority numbers in higher
education will be filled by Asian Pacific Americans-at least certain
ethnic subsets of Asians. We will be used to cover the gaps of mi-
nority groups harder hit by these new policies.
Those are the numbers. What's going to happen this year?
You'll see a little bit of a perk-up in some of the minority figures.
Why? Boalt Hall will make some changes on the margin, although
there won't be any great adjustments this year. Boalt is eliminating
the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC) adjustments for under-
graduate institutions, i.e., differential "weighting" of GPAs based on
the college attended. It has also added a socioeconomic index as a
factor for some admissions on the margin. More files will go to fac-
ulty members for discretionary reads, where the policy exhorts
consideration of more factors, but nothing that's clearly defined. The
Admissions Director described the new approach as "a bigger net to
cast into deeper waters. '5 8 So we'll see some minority students here
and there. You won't see those zeroes.
But what Boalt did not do, at least this year, is more significant.
It did not decide to move away from the LSAT. It did not go to an
index score system, like UCLA, with multiple factors systematically
included. It did not fundamentally re-examine what merit means in
the law school admissions context. It did not entirely rethink admis-
sions. (I'm sure we'll have a discussion about Jack's presentation.) It
55. Id., at 4, 13. Only one Vietnamese student actually enrolled. See id. at tbl. 2
("Minority Admissions, 1987-97'). The "Southeast Asians" category was confusingly
redefined that year to include subcontinental Indians as well as Vietnamese.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 4. There were seven total Chicana/o-Latina/o students admitted in
1997, 3% of the class. An additional seven Chicana/o-Latina/o students who had
deferred from 1996 also entered in 1997. Id. at 3.
58. Conversation with Edward Tom, Director of Admissions for the University
of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall) (Feb. 18, 1998).
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did not consider what our goals should be and what our law school,
particularly as a public law school, should be doing with its slots.
By the way, you might have heard that UC was thinking about
getting rid of the SAT. They're not going to. The latest report is that
they like the SAT because it's a "good indicator," and they've con-
cluded that getting rid of it would not help minorities anyway.5 9
What has been the effect of Proposition 209 on lawyers and
Asians? Those are my last two questions.
The effect on lawyers is that we'll have lots to do, but we'll
probably keep losing. The pre-209 lawsuits that Pete Wilson initiated
to get rid of affirmative action-suing his own state agencies to stoC
discriminating against Whites-will continue to be an uphill battle.
There is also a suit against the University Regents alleging that they
violated the Open Meetings Act because of the way they assembled
for their vote. This case is stalled, and 209 obviously preempts much
gain from it.
61
On the margins, we are preparing to defend affirmative action
against various interpretations of the scope of 209. For example, how
far can recruitment go? How much can scholarships consider race?
And so on.
From the left, MALDEF has brought a complaint against Boalt
Hall under Title VI. 62 That complaint alleges that Boalt knew that the
59. Pamela Burdman, UC Regents Set Aside Proposal to Drop SAT, S.F. CHRONICLE,
Feb. 20, 1998, at A21. Professor Keith Widaman, chairman of the Board of Admis-
sions and Relations with Schools, testified at a recent Regents meeting that the SAT
did a better job of predicting freshman performance for Black and Latina/o students
than for White students, and that eliminating the SAT would increase number of
Latinas/os eligible for UC from 3.8 percent to only 4 percent. Id. This contradicted
the conclusion of a recent Task Force on Latino Eligibility that had called for the SAT
to be optional in admissions; indeed, Widaman said the committee has considered
increasing the role of the SAT in admissions. Id.
60. See, e.g., Wilson v. State Personnel Board, No. 96-CS01082, slip op. (Cal.
Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty. Nov. 30, 1998). On November 30, 1998, Judge Connelly
ruled that some state programs were and some programs were not violative of equal
protection and/or Proposition 209. Id. at 10-28. As this goes to print, that decision is
likely to be appealed. See Harriet Chiang & Robert B. Gunnison, Affirmative Action
Laws Clear Hurdle/Ruling Deals Blow to Wilson's Lawsuit, S.F. CHRONICLE, Dec. 1, 1998,
at Al. For an additional example of this type of challenge, see Monterey Mechanical
Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 715 (9th Cir. 1997) (ruling that specific state contracting
goals for affirmative action to be violations of equal protection under strict scrutiny,
in a suit by a private plaintiff).
61. See Molloy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. 97-6123 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Francisco Cty., filed Feb. 16, 1996) (action stayed pending decision by Court of Ap-
peals).
62. Complaint letter filed by Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
et al. with the Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Education, file number 09-
97-2089-I (March 19, 1997) (pending). MALDEF, the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, and the Asian Pacific American Legal Center of Southern Califor-
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new admissions policy would disparately impact minority admis-
sions, but knowingly went ahead with it. Then sure enough, look at
what happened. That complaint is before the Office of Civil Rights,
which is currently in a terrible political position over it
63
In addition to these, there is a new lawsuit: Boalt Hall is being
sued for having minority scholarships. These are funded solely
through private alumni contributions, and Boalt itself doesn't ad-
minister the program, the alumni do. However, the plaintiffs allege
state action because our alumni office created and compiled lists of
eligible students for the alums."
The message is that you will be sued. No matter what you do,
no matter how much you try to follow the rules, no matter how
much you anticipate defending approaches that seem reasonable,
you're going to be sued. So you might as well live in a world in
which you assume that you will be sued and decide what you are
going to defend.
I've run out of time just as I was going to talk about the impact
on Asians. But much of what I was going to say has already been
suggested: we are not a monolith. The numbers from Boalt that I
read earlier illustrate the tremendous diversity within the Asian
community. To telescope to one example, we have extreme per cap-
ita differences in income. If we substitute socio-economic factors for
race and ethnicity in California, consider that Japanese, Asian Indi-
ans (subcontinental), and Chinese are above the national average per
capita income. On the other hand, Filipinas/os, Thais, Koreans, Pa-
cific Islanders and Southeast Asians are below it.6 Annual per capita
nia also have filed an action against Boalt Hall in federal court. See Complaint, Rios
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Civ. No. C99-0525 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 2, 1999).
63. See, e.g., Craig Roberts, Running away with the Law, THE WASH. TIMES, Aug.
23, 1997, at C1 (noting that Norma Cantu, head of the Education Department's Office
for Civil Rights "was denounced last week by Senate Judiciary Chairman Orrin G.
Hatch and other senators for riding roughshod over the 'will of the people, the
courts and the Constitution' in her determined effort to impose illegal racial quotas
on the University of California and the University of Texas.").
64. See Driscoll v. Kay, No. 790351-7 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cty. dismissed
Jan. 4, 1999). On January 4, 1999, after a confidential settlement by the parties, the
case was dismissed with prejudice. See Email correspondence from Annemarie C.
O'Shea, Attorney, Morrison and Forester, to Marina Hsieh, Acting Prof. of Law,
University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall) (Feb. 18, 1999) (on file with author).
65. The following figures for per capita income by enthnicity appear in We're in
the Money, ASIAN WEEK, Jan. 19, 1996, at 19 tbl. 2.
Japanese $19,373
Asian Indian 17,777
N-H White 16,074
Chinese 14,876
US 14,420
Filipino 13,616
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income ranges from over $19,000 for Japanese Americans to $2,700
for Hmongs.6 We have enormous differences.
We also have great disparities in educational levels, not only by
ethnic subgroup, but within them. You've probably heard that many
Asians have higher rates of college education than Whites or the
national average. But Vietnamese, Pacific Islanders, Samoans, Ton-
gans, Cambodians, Laotians, and the Hmong lag far behind.67 And
the differences within groups can be extreme: seven percent of Asian
American adults in this country have not completed the fifth grade,
lagging far behind not only non-Hispanic Whites, but African
Americansi8 Some groups, like Chinese Americans, have high rates
of both college graduates and adults with less than a fifth grade
education.69 We have enormous educational disparities.
I'm supposed to stop talking. The big question is "Where will
Asians be in the affirmative action debate?" I think we must be par-
ticularly sensitive to being what I will call the "displacers," the fillers
of the minority numbers. Whether or not we have been or will be
targeted for affirmative action, we are going to be cited in with the
minorities to pad out the numbers. We are almost all of the Boalt
Hall minority student population, the White versus minority figure.
I was just at the University of Maryland in Baltimore, a majority
African American city. There, after an important decision about use
of race in scholarships, 70 the University of Maryland, the largest
public law school in that state, has moved to a race-blind admissions
system. The student body dropped from being about 20 percent
African American to 10 percent African American.7' But their total
Thai 11,970
Korean 11,177
Pac Islander 10,342
Vietnamese 9032
Samoan 7690
Tongan 6144
Laotian 5597
Cambodian 5120
Hmong 2692
66. Id.
67. Arthur Hu, Making the Grade, ASIAN WEEK, Jan. 19, 1996, at 18 (reporting
1990 Census data showing that Asian Indians, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean,
and Thai are all above the White and U.S. averages.)
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
71. In 1995, the entering class included 59 African American enrollees (21%).
Letter from Jim Forsyth, Associate Dean for Admissions and Registration, University
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minority numbers haven't dropped. Why? Because in six years the
Asian American population in the law school rocketed from 3.5
percent to 12 percent. 2 The University of Maryland 1997 entering
law school classes was more Asian American than African Ameri-
73can.
Now that's Maryland, hardly an Asian stronghold compared to
California. What does that tell us about the Asian Pacific American
role in minority headcounts?
I'll stop there, on an ambivalent note, but Sumi will fix that!
PROFESSOR MALAMUD: Our last panelist is Sumi Cho from
DePaul University College of Law. Sumi and I have been joined at
the waist for the last couple of years. I have commented on her work
in panels and she has commented on mine. I'm now adding a mod-
erator role to our repertoire. Sumi, it's your turn next.
She has a PhD in Ethnic Studies from Berkeley. She was a very
involved activist on the Berkeley campus and has carried that activ-
ism into her work as a law professor. She has written extensively on
issues having to do with Asian Americans, Asian Americans and the
law, Asian Americans in relation to African Americans and
race/gender interactions in American law and social reality.
Sumi Cho.
PROFESSOR CHO: Thank you. First I want to congratulate the or-
ganizers of this very successful event. It is really quite an
achievement to behold and a pleasure to be a participant. And to-
ward that end, I also want to acknowledge the alumni, who have
had a large role in the success today. Not simply Jack, but I see some
people who have returned, traveling quite a distance to be here.
Emmeline Kim Owyang, Emily Houh, and Colin Owyang are alums
who formed the first Critical Race Theory reading group here at the
University of Michigan. That group laid the ground work for the
Michigan Journal of Race & Law. Your symposium's success today is
really built upon a tradition of APALSA activism.
of Maryland School of Law, to Marina Hsieh, (Sept. 11, 1998) (on file with author).
That fell to 28 enrollees in 1996 (10%). Id.
72. In 1991, the entering class included 10 Asian/Asian American enrollees
(3.5%), that figure grew to 32 enrollees in 1997 (12%); by contrast, the 1991 entering
class included 75 African American enrollees (26%). Telephone conversation be-
tween Jim Forsyth, Associate Dean for Admissions and Registration, University of
Maryland School of Law and Marina Hsieh (Feb. 11, 1999). The 1997 class only had
28 (10%). Id.
73. In 1995, there were 59 African Americans and 25 Asian/Asian Americans of
277 enrollees. Forsyth letter and telephone conversation, supra notes 71-72. In 1996,
there were 28 of each of these minority groups of 267 enrollees. Id. In 1997 there were
28 African Americans and 32 Asian/Asian American enrollees. Id.
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In addition, the amount of faculty support that you have is im-
pressive. It's not simply the number of moderators who join us
today on the panels, but at how many other universities would you
have such a turnout among the faculty for an APALSA event on a
Saturday? So that's a real credit as well to the support and resources
that you have to draw on from the law school as well as from the
main campus, with Professor Gail Nomura74 here from the Asian
American Studies department. I really think that you are fortunate
to have developed such a community.
I want to address a phenomenon I've been observing in the
various talks that Jerry,75 Jack,76 Frank, Marina,78 and I have been
giving on affirmative action across the country, often at the behest of
Asian Pacific American students. Typically, in these talks during the
question and answer period, at least one APA student will voice
concerns about how s/he perceive affirmative action to be hurting,
not helping, APAs as a group, and express heightened anxieties
about where we fit within a Black/white 79 race paradigm. On the
one hand, we suffer from white-inflicted racism, but on the other
hand, we are excluded from racial remedies designed for African
Americans. I sense from supportive yet discomforted crowd reac-
tions to this type of question, that the sentiment is shared by more
than one student. I want to address what I perceive as the sense of
APA "ambivalence" on the issue of affirmative action and consider
how Critical Race Theory ("CRT") and Critical Asian Pacific Ameri-
can perspectives may. help us to overcome this ambivalence.
Let me start with a CRT insight-that is, the critique of civil
rights and anti-discrimination law as a false panacea for society's
racial ills. The CRT critique embraces, alternatively, a synergistic
74. Director of Asian/Pacific American Studies Program, University of Michi-
gan.
75. Jerry Kang, Acting Professor, University of California, Los Angeles, School of
Law.
76. Gabriel Chin, Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
77. Frank Wu, Associate Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law.
78. Marina Hsieh, Acting Professor, University of California, Berkeley, School of
Law, Boalt Hall.
79. Kimberl Crenshaw explains that she capitalizes "Black" and does not capi-
talize "white" because "Black constitutes a particular cultural group, and thus
requires a proper noun, while "white" encompasses many cultural and ethnic groups
and therefore does not. See Kimberl Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, Intersectional-
ity, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 2144
n.6 (1991). For similar reasons I also capitalize "Black" but do not capitalize "white,"
but I expand the category of "cultural group" to "political-cultural group" to respond
to the anti-essentialist critique and to recognize that the externally imposed raciali-
zation of groups of color based upon white supremacy interacts with the internally
generated cultural group formation. See Sumi Cho, Multiple Consciousness and the
Diversity Dilemma, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 1035, 1037 n.8 (1997).
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and systematic understanding of racism as foundational to US soci-
ety and law, rather than understanding racism as an individual,
aberrant prejudice-a view that tends to undergird much of
anti-discrimination law as evinced by the strict causation and intent
requirements built into the proof structures of Title VII.
Critical Race Theory maintains that there are a wide range of
racial injuries and a narrow range of effective remedies. Conserva-
tives and the Supreme Court, on the other hand, would have you
believe that it's just the opposite: that there is a wide range of reme-
dies (including affirmative action) that requires narrow-tailoring
mandated under strict scrutiny review to address the very abbrevi-
ated range of injuries in this allegedly colorblind world.'
Critical Race Theory reminds us that employment discrimina-
tion and affirmative action are but two very limited and increasingly
compromised remedies. Imagine the limits of their scope and their
reach by envisioning the vista of the Grand Canyon as representa-
tive of the complex of US racisms. Then imagine that you have two
narrow cylinders through which you may glimpse only a small por-
tion of that canyon range and that these cylinders represent the
reach of employment discrimination laws and affirmative action
programs that are legally permissible means to address the Grand
Canyon of racial discriminations.
Now this Critical Race Theory insight might assist us in lessen-
ing APA ambivalence towards affirmative action, but we also need
to address, more fully and specifically, latent APA community con-
cerns. For that I will introduce what I will refer to as an Asian critical
or "APA Crit" insight of what has been referred to as the "critique of
the Black/white paradigm."
In light of critiques of the critique of the Black/white para-
digm8 on which I won't elaborate here, I am going to suggest a shift
in terminology and focus toward an analysis of differential racisms
under white supremacy 82 to ground an APA Crit methodology. Let me
80. See, e.g., STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK
AND WHITE 449-51 (1997) (arguing that the benefits of affirmative action have not
been proven and that Blacks have made significant progress without it); Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (evaluating the scope of remedy imposed in school deseg-
regation case).
81. See Leslie Espinoza and Angela Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby-
Lat Crit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 1585 10 LA RAZA L.J. 499,
506-07 (1997) (describing Lat Crit Theory as an attempt to complicate our under-
standing of the mechanics of racial oppression by expanding the analytical focus to
include non-white, non-Black others, as well as gender-based and international
critiques).
82. For a comparison of the related concepts of "differential racialization" and
"differential forms of disempowerment" forwarded by race theorists TomAs Alma-
guer, Jeff Chang, and Eric Yamamoto, see TOMAS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES:
[VOL. 4:195
Panel on Affirmative Action
explain what I mean by analyzing our topic for this panel from an
APA Crit perspective.
As an imperfect remedy, affirmative action does not address
many of the prevalent forms of discrimination commonly experi-
enced by Asian Pacific Americans, nor, I would argue, the varying
ways in which APAs are uniquely racialized in U.S. society. What
makes it Asian Crit or APA Crit? The APA part of the APA Crit in-
sight is the recognition of this particular difference among groups of
color. But what makes it "crit" is the commitment to understand the
consistency of racial hierarchy and white supremacy among these
differential racisms.
In today's talk I'm going to try to explore two forms of these
differential racisms-over-parity discrimination and cultural v.
material injuries-as they pertain to APAs and the mainstream un-
derstanding of affirmative action. I will close by demonstrating why,
despite these differential racisms, it is necessary for APAs to support
and defend affirmative action as part of a larger, ongoing movement
against white supremacy, a movement that benefits not only APAs
directly, but human society overall.
I turn first to the analysis of differential racisms to understand
APA ambivalence toward affirmative action. This differential racism
is comprised of and reflects the varying types of material cultural
injuries that APAs experience as a group as distinct from those of
other groups of color. To forward this discussion, I'd like to intro-
duce the concept of what I refer to as "over-parity discrimination"-
that is, the problem of conflating the concept of over-parity with
non-discrimination.
But in order to set up the discussion of over-parity discrimina-
tion, indulge me in a little bit of critical race historicization of
affirmative action's genesis and development. Affirmative action
was created and endorsed as a result of a political compromise
forged against a backdrop of mounting racial and political turbu-
lence and social criticism throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. It
was seen as necessary to lay to rest a period of very intense racial
conflict.'
THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA 4-7, 9 (1994)
(forwarding concept of "differential racism"); ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL
JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 116-23
(1999) (same); and Jeff Chang, Race, Class, Conflict. and Empowerment: On Ice Cube's
"Black Korea," 19 AMERASIA J. 102-03 (1993) reprinted in LOS ANGELES STRUGGLES
TOWARD MULTIETHNIC COMMUNITY 87, 103 (Edward Chang & Russell C. Leong eds.,
1994) (discussing "differential forms of disempowerment").
83. See MANNING MARABLE, BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE: TRANSFORMING
AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICS 83-84 (1995) (detailing the effects of the Nixon Ad-
ministration's affirmative action policies in laying the foundation for the current
popular perception of those policies); see also CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J.
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As such, affirmative action had a very narrow reformist scope,
often targeting high-profile points of socioeconomic entry, including
admissions into higher educational institutions and entry level hir-
ing in certain professions and civil service occupations. 4 Indeed, it
was President Richard Nixon who sought to co-opt the movement
for Black Power into Black capitalism through affirmative action
policies.8 He was also one of the strongest advocates of promoting
affirmative action in the corporate world.8
So these modest racial reform measures often failed to address
other important areas of racial imbalance, such as graduation in
college or employee advancement and promotion, as well as other
forms of on-campus or on-the-job environmental discrimination.
Why? Because they were not intended to do so. Nor has affirmative
action successfully addressed the societal lockout of low income
people of color who have, by and large, been defined out of affirma-
tive action programs, prompting critics to attack this limited reform
on the basis that it serves a predominantly middle-class constitu-
87ency.
Now, because persistent and institutionalized and often subtle
forms of discrimination are very difficult to uproot and have been
left unaddressed by Title VII,8 governmental officials in charge of
monitoring affirmative action compliance began, in the early 1970s,
to compare the percentage representation of an eligible, disadvan-
taged minority group in the relevant labor, business, or applicant
pool (the baseline percentage or the "applicant pool," as it's known)
against their percentage representation in employment, contracting,
or university admissions-their actual representation (or what's
referred to as the "applicant flow").
MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 23-25
(1997) (discussing the rise of affirmative action programs in corporate America);
Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Historicizing Critical Race Theory's Cutting Edge: Key
Movements that Performed the Theory, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: HISTORIES,
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, (Frank Valdes et al. eds., forthcoming 1999).
84. LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 83, at 25.
85. See MARABLE, supra note 83, at 83-84 (describing the Nixon administration's
affirmative action polices as working towards the suppression of radical factions and
the adoption of conservative measures).
86. Id. at 83-84.
87. See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1327, 1333-34 (1986) (criticizing an objection of
affirmative action programs that states that the programs benefit middle-class
Blacks, one of the populations least harmed by discrimination). But see Deborah
Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 COLO. L. REV.
939 (1997) (arguing that the minority middle class, as well as lower income groups,
have been subject to race-based inequity and thus are an appropriate target of af-
firmative action policies).
88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (1994).
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This parity, as it's popularly known, reflects a close approxima-
tion or a balance between the baseline representation or applicant
pool and the actual percentage or the applicant flow. If a protected
group is significantly under-parity, liability may ensue. As a result,
the corporate world (and educational institutions) often adopted
affirmative action plans as a defense mechanism to legal liability.
In 1977, the Court approved a theory of systemic disparate
treatment in Hazelwood 89-provable by statistics if one could demon-
strate a "gross disparity" between the expected versus observed
percentages of protected groups in the workplace." And so we can
see the developmental logic of employment discrimination of how
this disparity or state of under-parity equates with the inference of
discrimination. Parity is further enshrined one year later in the his-
toric Bakke9' decision. There, Justice Powell privileged the forward-
looking rationale of diversity and dispensed with the backward-
looking compensatory rationales, including the long history of white
supremacy and the law's complicity thereto." Thus, the stage was set
for the exultation of "diversity" and the measurement of such,
through proportionalism or the search for parity.
Now let me make clear that I'm not taking issue with the
equation of under-parity representation with the inference of dis-
crimination. Rather, I dispute the assumption that the kind of
logically converse relationship that over-parity, or as it's been called,
over-representation, automatically comports with an inference of
non-discrimination or the absence of discrimination. I believe that
this converse equation has also been made, not in legal doctrine, but
flowing from the logic of legal doctrine, so that it has just become
"common sense" that groups that are over-parity automatically are
considered to be free from any type of discrimination.
For students of APA history, we know that this common sense
is not in keeping with what we often have experienced. Rather, in
keeping with our history of labor market exclusion, racialized and
gendered labor, and immigration policies that created confined la-
bor "niches" for APAs, our experiences confirm the co-existence of
over-parity representation and discrimination. In other words, it has
been at the very moment at which we exist over-parity in a particu-
lar labor market that we have been subjected to the most
discrimination.
89. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
90. Id. at 307-13.
91. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
92. For a discussion of the diversity rationale as a permissible State interest in
using a suspect classification, see id. at 311-14.
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That was the exact situation presented in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,3
which involved an over-parity representation of Chinese in the
laundry business-a concentration resulting from a series of prior
occupational exclusions. At the time of Yick Wo in 1886, there were
240 Chinese laundry operators in the city of San Francisco out of 320
total, with the remaining 80 laundries operated by whites. In per-
centages, Chinese operated 75% of San Francisco's laundries while
comprising less than 10% of the city's population.94 These numbers
certainly reflect over-parity representation in the field of the laundry
business. Yet the conflation of over-parity and non-discrimination
really does not hold here, as of the 201 licenses denied to operate
laundries, 200 were Chinese and only one was white! Such admini-
stration of the law-delivered with an "evil eye" and "uneven hand"
rendered the ordinance unconstitutional. 95
Nor did it hold for first-generation Japanese Issei immigrants in
terms of their phenomenal agricultural productivity. When the Issei,
who comprised 2% of California's population in 1920, and con-
trolled less than 2% of the Golden State's agricultural lands began to
produce over 90% of California's berry crop and over 50% of its
onion, asparagus, green vegetable, and celery crops, they began to
96threaten agribusiness and white farmers. Never mind that these
agricultural crops were largely shunned by white farmers due to the
hard manual labor required in a stooped position. It was at this
moment that the Issei's over-parity representation in that labor mar-
ket also brought down upon them increased legislation and
enforcement of alien land laws97 as well as anti-citizenship98 and anti-
93. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
94. According to 1880 Census data, there were 21,745 Chinese in San Francisco
compared to 210,496 Whites. See Elmer Clarence Sandmeyer, THE ANTI-CHINESE
MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 19 (1991).
95. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74.
96. According to the 1920 Census, the population of California was 3,426,861, of
which 70,196 were of Japanese ancestry. See K. K. KAWAKAMI, THE REAL JAPANESE
QUESTION 259 (Arno Press 1978) (1921). The Japanese Agricultural Association of
California recorded that in 1920, Japanese Californians owned .07% of the state's
land, and farmed 1.64%. Id. at 265. Despite these modest numbers, Japanese immi-
grants cultivated disproportionate percentages of fruits and vegetables in California:
91% of the total berry crop, 81.2% of onion; 65.4% of asparagus; 58.8% of green
vegetables, and 53.3% of celery. Id. at 266 (citing data compiled for 1920 by the Japa-
nese Agricultural Association).
97. See Keith Aoki, No Right to Own? The Early-Twentieth Century "Alien Land
Laws" as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C.L.REV. (forthcoming 1999); Dudley 0.
McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35 CAL. L.
REV. 7, 12-17 (1947) (depicting anti-alien land laws as a response to a perceived
threat from Japanese land ownership).
98. Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A
"Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L. REV. 1111, 1120-21 (1998)
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immigrant measures," and eventually, I would argue, internment.
So I maintain that over-parity is inappropriately conflated with the
concept of non-discrimination in APA History, as well as in contem-
porary experiences.
Now I have time only to describe briefly five areas of contem-
porary over-parity discrimination that remain unaddressed through
the policy of affirmative action or, for that matter, Title VII. I gave a
talk for the Asian Pacific Americans in Higher Education Conference
a couple years ago and my comments are recorded on this matter for
people who want the more detailed version of this.'0° But in that
article, I identified the most common types of over-parity discrimi-
nation that we face in the particular employment field of academe.
First, there is tenure and promotion denial: Asian Pacific
American faculty suffer one of the lowest tenure rates, at 41 percent,
compared to a 52 percent overall rate.10' Perhaps model minority
stereotypes may trigger, for example, academic jealousy and fears of
unfair competition that may serve to isolate Asian Pacific Americans
from established and voting colleagues, as well as from other junior
faculty. Fears of Asian superiority are often compensated by nega-
tive model minority ascriptions of deficits in intangible categories,
such as "presence," "self-confidence" or "collegiality" that are often
used to deny candidates promotion or tenure. That's just one exam-
ple.
A second category is professional tracking. For example, almost
70% of all APA Ph.D.s awarded in 1993 were in the fields of engi-
neering, life sciences, and physical sciences. 02 By contrast, APAs are
severely underrepresented in many humanities and social sciences
fields and in professional schools. Data on full-time faculty from 1992
reveals that APAs were less than 3% in the following fields: history
(2.2%); English/literature (2.1%), philosophy (1.8%); education (1.6%);
(discussing the discriminatory effects of the Supreme Court's interpretation of natu-
ralization laws).
99. Id. at 1121 (discussing how the Chinese Exclusion Laws used national sover-
eignty as an argument for disallowing Asians from immigrating to the United
States).
100. See generally Sumi Cho, Confronting the Myths: Asian Pacific American Faculty
in Higher Education, in Affirmative Action and Discrimination, Proceedings of the 9th
Annual Conference of Asian and Pacific Americans in Higher Education 31 (Ling-chi
Wang ed. 1996). This topic will also be the basis for an expanded article examining
contemporary employment discrimination cases involving APAs.
101. Id. at 35.
102. Cho, Confronting the Myths, supra note 100, at 38 (citing LINDA ZIMBLER,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
FAULTY AND INSTRUCTION STAFF: WHO ARE THEY AND WHAT DO THEY DO? 7, 14-15
(1994).
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psychology (1.4%); political science (1.3%); law (0.9%).'0 Now some
may argue that such categorical concentration represent "free
choice" or the cultural priorities of APAs as a group, as opposed to
exclusionary practices. But this analysis begs the question by failing
to see how exclusionary practices or stereotyping may shape both
the cultural priorities of a group and individual choices.
Another problem is the phenomenom of academic caste. At the
executive and managerial levels, APAs comprise only 1 out of 100
positions.'0° Lawsuits filed by APAs alleging employment discrimi-
nation against universities suggest that stereotypical notions of a
groupwide lack of leadership and communication skills adversely
affect the selection and promotion of APAs as CEOs or lower level
university administrators. This problem, combined with the prob-
lem of tenure denial discussed earlier, has been referred to as the
"glass ceiling" that societal out-groups hit when attempting to ad-
vance to the upper echelons of an institution or industry.
The particular susceptibility of APA women to the problem of
sexual and racial harassment is a fourth area of over-parity discrimi-
nation. This problem may stem in part from the convergence of
racial and sexual stereotypes in a process that I have referred to in
previous work as the 'model minority meeting Suzie Wong.' 10 Un-
fortunately, as critical race feminists have pointed out, claims of
sexual or racial harassment by women of color often fail due to the
bifurcated, non-intersecting nature of race versus gender-based har-
assment and discrimination causes of action, combined with a legal
standard requiring the harassment to be "pervasive and severe.'' °
The final over-parity problem I'll discuss today is accent dis-
crimination. This problem often arises when students complain
about the accents of faculty members of Asian-ancestry. The prob-
lem usually arises in subject areas such as mathematics, physical or
biological sciences, or engineering. In these difficult subjects, the
alleged failure by a professor of Asian-ancestry provides a conven-
ient excuse for a student's poor performance. Even when evidence of
racial and national origin bias accompanies complaints of accent and
teaching problems, the conflation of parity with nondiscrimination
may lead courts to discount such evidence and deny the operation of
discriminatory intent.
103. Id.
104. Cho, Confronting the Myths, supra note 100, at 39 (citing EEOC Survey, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Higher Education Staff Survey, 1989 EEO-6
Detail Summary report, unpublished data, 1991).
105. Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the
Model Minority Myth Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RAcE & JUST. 177 (1997).
106. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. (1996); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
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These five forms of over-parity discrimination against APAs in
employment highlight distinct types of racial discrimination un-
derappreciated by law and society. Cases alleging over-parity
discrimination of these kinds tend to be spectacularly unsuccessful,
perhaps due to judicial (and societal) discomfort with the possibility
that discrimination can co-exist in a state of over-parity representa-
tion. Such a conclusion seems to defy our "racial common sense"-at
least that which is forged under the dominant liberal Black/white
race relations paradigm. For this reason, APA progressive political
activism, combined with APA Crit research and analysis, is neces-
sary to understand both the differentiated nature of racial
discrimination as well as the consistency of white supremacy.
With one third of my talk left and only 30 seconds to go, let me
just give short shrift to my distinction between cultural versus mate-
rial injuries, which is a second difference that may explain APA
student ambivalence to affirmative action, gleaned from, perhaps, a
sociological understanding of APA student life experiences to date.
When you teach Asian American Studies, you find out quickly what
the most impassioned discussion topic is. Is it anti-Asian violence?
No. Is it employment discrimination? No. Is it Asian admissions?
No. What is it? Interracial relationships, dating, and raced/gendered
stereotypes, without question, in my experience, hands down, has
been the hottest topic. That is to say that there are cultural injuries of
racism that are suffered by APA students of such a breadth and
depth at a formative period of their adult lives, that may, perhaps,
skew an appreciation for the material injuries that one encounters
out in the workplace. Because affirmative action is in large part a
material remedy addressing material injustices,0 7 APA students may
feel affirmative action misses the centrality of the culturally-based
oppression they are confronting.
In conclusion, in light of "over-parity discrimination" (and to a
lesser extent, the cultural versus material injury distinction), I hope
we have a better understanding of APA ambivalence toward af-
firmative action. I'd also like to say that despite these ambivalences
toward affirmative action, I hope that the following three insights
107. This is to deny neither the cultural nature of racial discrimination and the
cultural disrespect attending it, nor the impact that affirmative action has had on
rectifying this cultural disrespect through physical inclusion of "others." It is simply
to acknowledge the primary function of affirmative action policies to redistribute
scarce material resources (quality education and jobs) for redress of materially-based
injuries of white supremacy. See MARABLE, supra note 83, at 81 (discussing how
affirmative action was never construed as a law or continuous policy); Cheryl I.
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1777-91 (1993) (expounding a
theory of affirmative action as a means toward deconstructing and eliminating white
supremacy).
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will prompt other APA students in the country to join with the Uni-
versity of Michigan APALSA in defending affirmative action: first,
that we need a Critical Race Theory understanding of racial dis-
crimination that is synergistic and systemic, and that comprehends
that affirmative action is no panacea, but one, limited remedy that
has been continually compromised by its opponents; second, that we
must have an APA Crit understanding of differential racisms, how
they impact us through fears of cultural superiority, as opposed to
what Judge Leon Higginbothom refers to as the "precept of inferior-
ity"'1° imposed on African Americans, and the largely unremediable
practice of over-parity discrimination through either affirmative
action or employment discrimination; and finally, how we must take
this understanding of differential racisms, not to attack the unfin-
ished project of Black liberation °9 towards a more narrow
nationalism, but rather to develop a coalitional theory of the transi-
tivity of white supremacy and how the differential racisms directed
towards people of color and the differential oppressions directed
towards women, the poor, and gays and lesbians, for example, are
inextricably linked to one another.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR MALAMUD: On the assumption that generating dis-
cussion will not be this panel's problem, we have the potential, at
least, to extend this session as much as an additional fifteen minutes
if the questioning justifies it. So prove the organizers right, please,
and jump on in.
Yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is a question for both Jack and Sumi.
Sumi says that we have to take a much more sophisticated approach
and not just focus on diversity, but Jack, you say that if we want to
be lawyerly about it, we can have the policy, but never say it pub-
licly because that's not what Bakke permits. Is that what you're
recommending or are you recommending that we do something
else?
108. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHOM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 7-17 (1996) (describing the precept
of inferiority as a "state of the mind and the logic of the heart" and detailing its
effects on the civil rights actions).
109. Here, I refer to "Black liberation" in the British sense, i.e., Black refers to all
those who are non-White. Thus, Black liberation in the British sense also includes
Brown, Yellow, and Red liberation in the U.S. sense. See PAUL GILROY, THERE AIN'T
No BLACK IN THE UNION JACK 60-61 (1991).
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PROFESSOR CHIN: Of course we should think about it for the fu-
ture because the pendulum swings back and forth. There may be an
opportunity to get future Supreme Courts to accept different com-
pelling interests that would justify affirmative action. But at the
moment, at the moment, to stand our ground and to say that build-
ing the Black bar, building the Asian American bar, or building the
Filipino bar is a legitimate justification and we're going to do it
means we're going to get an injunction against us that says you can't
take race into account. It's a losing strategy. It's an immediately
losing strategy.
The latest suit is more sophisticated. They have named individual
deans and admissions officers as defendants with unlimited personal
liability. Are these defendants going to stick to the idea that they're
going to admit Filipino applicants because they deserve to have their
bar built even if it means going to jail? It's not going to happen.
PROFESSOR MALAMUD: If I can add something in response to this
and also in response to Jack. I've done writing that has raised exactly
this puzzle of whether we are allowed to talk about socioeconomic
inequality anymore. If this will kill us because we'll have that used
against us in depositions, we may not be able to do so. Needless to
say, when you're at an institution that's been sued and you're a
scholar in this field, that's a question that comes very much to mind.
But to be somewhat conventional about this, I don't think that
the sense that these kinds of arguments are undervalued should be
taken too far. What the Supreme Court has told us is that we are not
allowed to name things like building the Filipino bar or curing gen-
eralized social and economic discrimination as the basis for the
compelling state interest in affirmative action. But where I disagree
with Jack is that I don't think that we have to be blind to those issues
when it comes to addressing the question of whether affirmative
action is or is not narrowly-tailored towards achieving what we are
allowed to want, which is diversity. In other words, I don't think
that we are required to say that for every form of diversity we value,
we need to use affirmative action as a way of achieving it. I don't
know what's behind the choice of the words in the catalog, but I
don't think that there would be anything wrong with an institution
saying, "Yes, we value diversity and we want to have Asian and
Pacific American students at our schools, but we have noticed a
trend in the direction of not needing to use affirmative action in
order to achieve that," whereas for reasons having to do with pres-
ent and past discrimination, members of other minority groups are
having a harder time competing at the entrance level for those scarce
slots.
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So, again, what the Supreme Court has said is that there are a
narrow range of compelling state interests, but I don't think we're
required to blind ourselves to socioeconomic and other types of
relevant differences in deciding who needs affirmative action in
order to be included in a diverse community like this and who does
not.
Other questions? Jack, of course you get a chance to come back
if you would like.
Yes?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have two questions and they're for all four
panelists. The first is a very practical question of politics. I find that
with many audiences that are Asian American, affirmative action is
a very tough sell. If they support affirmative action, it is purely out
of a calculation of what benefit they, themselves, stand to gain; that
is you talk about small business set asides and that appeals to them
in very practical terms, not in ethical terms, not in terms of this type
of setting, but in the sound-byte format. What are you suggesting
will work, other than just raw self-interest, other than just the argu-
ment that the benefits outweigh the burdens of having affirmative
action? That's the first question.
The second question. Many of the strongest opponents of af-
firmative action proclaim color-blindness as either a legal doctrine
or as a moral principal. However, they become quite quickly color-
conscious when they talk about closing borders. It's a useful dichot-
omy to look at, say, Pete Wilson and some of his rhetoric. In other
words, people who are very explicit in advocating color-blindness in
affirmative action often immediately turn that around and say, "Oh,
and by the way, another thing we should do while we're at is close
the border. We've got too many people who don't look like us
coming in." Why are those of us who support immigration, or at
least very liberal levels or high levels or at least non-national origin-
centered policies in that context, but who also support affirmative
action, why are we not just the flip-side of that? Are we equally un-
principled?
PROFESSOR CHO: Why are we equally unprincipled?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: If we stand for color-blind immigration, but
also for affirmative action, why does that not expose us, at least to
the charge, that we're being inconsistent?
This is an argument Terry Eastland makes. He says that you
can't have immigration and affirmative action, that they're funda-
mentally incompatible, that you have to pick one or the other.
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PROFESSOR CHIN: Well, I think the thread is a common concern
for ultimate racial justice. In addition, people who support affirma-
tive action believe either that it will never happen without some
color-consciousness or that it will take too long without some color-
consciousness. So, in order to get to racial justice, you have to have
affirmative action in the meantime, or as Sumi says, affirmative
action is at least a small part of what really would be needed.
But when you talk about immigration, we can achieve justice
immediately simply by not considering factors that we think are not
relevant. We could have specific selection criteria for immigrants
and if people met them, the system would be non-discriminatory.
PROFESSOR CHO: This is what I would say to Terry Eastland. I
would first say that I do not worship at the shrine of colorblindness.
In fact, I believe that colorblindness lives next to biological determin-
ism. So if you consider the Brown u° decision in the context of 1954,
the enshrinement of colorblindness is necessary to be able to do
battle with the widespread belief of inherent Black inferiority. Why
else would we worship colorblindness so if it did not live next to the
period that we have just emerged from, of Jim Crow segregation and
enforced biological determinism?
So in that sense, because biological determinism doesn't even
resonate with me, colorblindness is not the corrective lens or the
filter device through which I attempt to achieve consistent policy-
making. I would say, rather, that the challenge is to ensure that we
fight and do battle with ongoing oppression and hierarchy, and in
particular, in this case, white supremacy. Both the race-neutral im-
migration reforms and race-conscious affirmative action policies that
you've mentioned are completely consistent with that goal.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Can the panel comment on University of
Texas Law School Professor Lino Graglia's comments that the dis-
parity in the racial composition of classes admitted on purely
academic merits is not due to racial discrimination or some racial
superiority, but rather simply the result of the different emphasis
that different ethnic groups place on education?
And as a policy matter, should we make college admissions a
reward in the structure of our incentive systems in order to motivate
young people to do the best?
PROFESSOR MALAMUD: Don't all speak at once.
PROFESSOR HSIEH: Jump into the breach, Sumi.
110. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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PROFESSOR CHO: That's simply the cultural determinism argu-
ment, which is the flip-side of the coin of biological determinism. I
think that we need to reject both of those arguments.
I was going to conclude my talk, if I had time, with a plea to
keep the faith in the face of the opposition's onslaught against af-
firmative action and the unstated but widespread assumptions that
undergird much of that opposition. I would say that about 98 per-
cent of these assumptions are grounded in either biological or
cultural determinism. We must reject that.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have a question for Professor Hsieh. You
spoke about the different levels of representation and the different
discriminations that affect, say, Filipinos and certain of the other
ethnic groups that constitute the APA identity, as compared with
those affecting Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans. That seems to con-
tradict the idea that Asian Americans are all treated alike, in the
sense that we all experience racial discrimination and that we're all
seen as the same by society. How do you resolve those two ideas so
that it makes sense to say that certain non-Asian groups deserve
affirmative action, or that affirmative action for APAs is definitely
needed because of the diversity within them?
PROFESSOR HSIEH: A lot of the questions have asked how do we
deal with these two arguments and have suggested that we have to
maintain a single position.
I think it's a question of perception from the inside and from
the outside. There is a perfectly valid truth that, in many instances,
all Asians will be treated alike, regardless of any subgroup distinc-
tions. That is the majority culture. To some extent even Asian Pacific
Islanders within the culture, with respect to each other, have certain
broad assumptions that remain true in terms of external treatment,
regardless of internal differences.
On the other hand, you start looking at the internal differences,
for example to build an argument that even under narrow justifica-
tions for specific affirmative action slots, we might still be able to
sneak past what's left after Bakke. Then we might make arguments
based on specific Asian subgroups. We may also make that argu-
ment for other purposes, not just as a calculation in our self-interest,
but simply to gain an understanding of what is happening within
these groups.
One of the reasons I cited the various statistical breakdowns
was to show that obviously affirmative action has affected certain
Asian subgroups disproportionately. For example, in Boalt Hall
admissions, Proposition 209 has had the same impact on Filipi-
nas/os that it has on African Americans. But who's talking about
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Filipinas/os as opposed to Asian Pacific Islanders as a group? The
big category is "APA" and that's the statistic that's being cited.
So I think that distinction is important.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But how do you argue that this is not some-
thing that is taken care of by other admissions standards?
PROFESSOR HSIEH: Right. I was telling Sumi this before our
panel, but didn't have time to get to it in my presentation. If you're
only looking at bottom lines and self-interest, it may be possible to
cobble together, using socioeconomic loopholes-which the Regents
have given Boalt explicit permission and encouragement to use-
something resembling the class of Asian American/Pacific Islanders
that used to get in to Boalt. I've said to look behind the numbers,
because we have a different group of Asians now. That's true now,
but we might be able to re-fill those slots by using, as a proxy, fac-
tors like income that we're allowed to use.
So if you want to know if we must have a race conscious admis-
sions policy in a place as narrow and as rarified as Boalt-and that
really is quite a narrow situation-you may be able to cobble to-
gether factors like income to tailor a solution on a case by case basis.
That may be possible, although I'm not sure everyone will do it.
I also think this goes back to the question, "What's the broader
reason for us to deal with affirmative action?" And it may not be just
for some bottom line number, because once you've used loopholes
creatively, you may be able to preserve your numbers. It may be just
because-and this goes back to what Sumi said-there is discrimina-
tion out there. You may or may not be able to show differences with
parity, under-parity, and over-parity, but there's discrimination out
there. Asking Asian/Pacific Islander communities to understand the
meaning of affirmative action is, in part, asking the communities to
acknowledge and recognize the existence of discrimination.
PROFESSOR MALAMUD: Before I recognize the next questioner, I
just want to add something. There's an analogy here. In some of the
work that I've done on affirmative action in relation to African
Americans, I've been trying to make the point that when you make a
switch in the direction of something resembling class-based affirma-
tive action, the group that generally gets left out is at least the upper
end of the African American middle class. One of the things that's,
disturbingly, happening during the course of the debates about
rethinking affirmative action is that people are losing track of the
fact that becoming middle class is not the be all and end all, meaning
that all discrimination is over.
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Certainly Sumi's idea of over-parity discrimination is one way to
think about this, but there is a great deal of denial. The groups that
have been traditionally victimized would like to believe that there is
an end to it, but sometimes the role of scholarship can be to say "Sorry,
you may not want to hear this, but you only think that you've arrived.
You only think that the discrimination is over." And this is an issue for
the APA community. If one switches in the direction of saying, "Ah-
ha, the Asian Pacific Americans who really need help are the Hmong
and the Filipinas/os and what we have to do is move away from giv-
ing any kind of assistance to the Japanese and the Chinese and the
Koreans," does that constitute a declaration from within the APA
community that Japanese, Chinese, and Korean Americans no longer
face discrimination? You have to be prepared to see discrimination
operating in different ways for different socioeconomic and national
origin subgroups of the populations that you're looking at in order to
not completely lose track of all of this variety that Sumi's talking
about.
Yes, in the back?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Professor Hsieh, you briefly discussed Asians
as the model minority. As an Asian American, by supporting affirma-
tive action don't I effectively propagate the model minority myth?
Many universities just see that I'm Asian American, so they may just
cut me off from any affirmative action. I'm a university student. I have
a voice, small though it may be. There are many people in communi-
ties of lower economic status than mine who don't have a voice and
can't speak out. Indeed, they should be receiving some affirmative
action. But many universities would not consider them as potential
candidates solely because of their ethnicity. So by supporting affirma-
tive action don't we just shut out their concerns? For the purposes of
unity, we might say we support affirmative action; we want it for our
community. But by supporting affirmative action as is, a lot of lower
income Asian Pacific Americans are being shut out. They can't speak
out.
PROFESSOR HSIEH: Well, I think the key statement, if I understand
your question, is your last phrase, "by... supporting affirmative ac-
tion as is." That "as is" measures the need for affirmative action based
on-to borrow from Sumi again-the formula that if there's no under-
parity then there must not be any discrimination, therefore there must
not be any need for affirmative action.
When we talk about what kind of affirmative action we support
and why we support it, we must be very careful to create an under-
standing, a common understanding, of what we mean by "affirmative
action." It may be a richly textured remedial response to broad-
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based societal discrimination that may not be at all what Lewis Powell
(a very gracious southern white gentleman) had in mind.
Whether Asians may be displacing each other or the Black mid-
dle class, or how socioeconomic factors affect which Asians might get
slots, are rich and interesting questions. Aside from these concerns,
however, I think there are a lot of reasons to support affirmative ac-
tion. I think diversity is a great reason.
I had a discussion last night with Alex Aleinikoff about what do
we do with Lowell High School and the fact that some Chinese par-
ents have sued to get their kids in.11' A consent decree binding San
Francisco schools caps the number of any one racial group at special
magnet schools at 40% of the total student body. The Chinese regu-
larly hit the limit at Lowell. That's because Chinese are the largest
users of the San Francisco public school system now."' What's my
argument? My argument is "Mom, I don't want to go to a school
that's 95 percent Chinese. I don't care if it's going to help me get into
Harvard." Of course that's not the only response, but frankly, I think
diversity is a great idea because I don't want to be in a school that's all
Asian, much less all white. That's not the world that we live in. So I
can disagree with Lewis Powell in one breath and then also sound like
him I suppose. There are a lot of reasons why we should want affirma-
tive action.
PROFESSOR CHO: I wanted to add something. I want to try to blur
two things. One is affirmative action as a policy in which groups re-
ceive a plus factor, let's say, in admissions. The other is affirmative
action as a movement overall in the war of position with white suprem-
acy. I want to blur those two things-affirmative action as a policy
and affirmative action as a movement against white supremacy-
because it may often be the case, as it is in university admissions, that
almost from the outset of affirmative action policy development in the
1960s and 1970s, that Asian Pacific Americans, as a group, were
111. Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-94-2418 (N.D.Cal. filed July 11,
1994); NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-78-1445 (N.D.Cal. filed June
30, 1978). A preliminary settlement in the Ho case was announced on February 17,
1999; a final settlement approval hearing is scheduled for April 20, 1999 before U.S.
District Judge William Orrick. See Joyce Nishioka, S.F. Schools Abolish Race Caps,
ASIAN WEEK, Feb. 18, 1999, at 13.
112. In 1998, 27.3% of all students in the San Francisco Unified School District
were Chinese American. CONSENT DEcREE MONITOR FOR STATE OF CALIFORNIA
REPORT 27 (July 31, 1998). San Francisco's public schools are overwhelmingly non-
White. Of the district's high school students, Asian Americans make up the largest
proportion at 41.9%, followed by Latinas/os at 18.7%, African Americans at 14.5%,
and non-Hispanic Whites at 12.2%. Stacey Lavilla, Diversity and Divisiveness, ASIAN
WEEK, Mar. 19, 1998, at 16.
FALL 19981
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
almost immediately at or above parity.113 So many universities took
them out of affirmative action "race-plus" consideration and didn't
disaggregate by ethnicity, class, gender, et cetera, that we may rec-
ommend doing now. This is to say that as an aggregate group in
undergraduate and many professional school admissions, we largely
did not benefit for very long, if at all, from the plus factor that Lewis
Powell was talking about.
However, I blur the distinction between the policy and the
movement because I would argue that we benefit greatly from the
movement against white supremacy, of which affirmative action is
but one expression, because fields that had heretofore been closed
off to us for consideration opened up through this new understand-
ing and commitment to inclusion. And the data behind me that I
have on the board, demonstrates the significance of this blurring:
ABA LAW STUDENT DATA
1971-72114 1996-97"-' % rate increase
% Numbers % Numbers in proportional
rep.
African 4.10% 3744 7.42% 9,542 181%
Americans
Latina/o 16  1.27% 1156 5.44% 6,995 428%
American 0.15% 140 0.87% 1,116 580%
Indian
APA 0.53% 480 5.99% 7,706 1,130%
113. Jayjia Hsia, Limits of Affirmative Action: Asian American Access to Higher Educa-
tion, 2 EDUC. POL'Y 117 (1988), reprinted in 63 THE REFERENCE SHELF: AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 76, 79-80 (Donald Altschiller, ed. 1991) (noting that the first racial demo-
graphic survey undertaken by UC Berkeley recorded Asian Americans as 6% of the
student population, while the national APA population was less than 1% in 1970).
114. For the 1996-97 data, see American Bar Association Approved Law Schools:
Statistical Information on American Bar Association Approved Law Schools 453
(Rick L. Morgan and Kurt Snyder, eds., 1998). For the years 1971-72 and 1996-76,
five and three ABA approved schools respectively did not report their minority
numbers.
115. Telephone conversation with ABA Minority Affairs Committee (Nov. 14,
1997).
116. I aggregated the three subcategories used by the ABA to create a Latina/o
category. The original breakdown is as follows:.
1971-72 1996-97
% Numbers % Numbers
Chicana/o 0.97% 883 1.89% 2429
Puerto Rican 0.10% 94 0.53% 686
Other Hispanic 0.20% 179 3.02% 3880
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I think it's been widely reported that Asian Americans are not
benefiting anymore from affirmative action policies. I was doing
some research, based on the ABA statistics for law students and the
change that's occurred in the past 25 years, in terms of representa-
tion. So I broke out, according to racial group, what the actual
numbers were for each group in 1971 to 1972 in parenthesis, and
what proportion percentage they represented of the overall law
student population of 91,225 law students in 1971-72. If you com-
pare the actual numbers, as well as the percentages and the rate of
percentage increase with the numbers 25 years later in 1996-1997,11'
which group would you say has benefited the most in terms of the
rate of the percentage increase?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But what about the Immigration Act of, I
believe it was 1975 [sic],"' that removed all racial exclusionary
boundaries from U.S. immigration policy? Because of that change, a
huge influx of, for example, Koreans and after that a lot of southeast
Asians came here. The Asian American population, in general, in-
creased greatly. So wouldn't it be fair to say that the Asian American
population increase was the reason for the increase in the number of
APA law students?
PROFESSOR CHO: Well, we had an increase from something like
one percent to three percent from the 1970 to the 1990 census. So the
300% increase in APA nationwide population (from 1-3%) from 1970
to 1990 is not commensurate with the greater than 1100% increase"9
in APA law student representation (from 0.53% to 5.99%) during the
same period. If you look back to 25 years ago or so, the predominant
understanding of Asian Pacific Americans was reflected on televi-
sion sets through the top-rated show Bonanza in the form of Hop
Sing; we were pre-linguistic and not really suited for arguing in a
courtroom. Under that same stereotype, 25 years ago, we would
probably not be law professors here, because we would be viewed as
ill-suited for the Socratic method's verbal jousting in front of the
117. In the 1996-97 school year, there were a total of 128,623 law students at ABA
approved law schools in the U.S.
118. The audience member is actually referring to the Immigration Act of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-235, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1-14354 (1994)).
For a detailed treatment of this Act, see Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution
Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75
N.C. L. Rev. 273 (1996).
119. Because a doubling of actual numbers is usually referred to as an increase of
100%, I have employed a similar methodology to describe the increase in APA law
student population figures.
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classroom. Instead, we would instead be law librarians, as a result of
being viewed as best-suited to meticulous, behind-the-scenes re-
search.
And it was the struggle with that type of racial stereotyping and
job restrictions that the movement for affirmative action as a means
to counteract white supremacy confronted, opening up a lot of these
barriers. It was this opening up that led APAs to the largest percent-
age increase in law student representation enjoyed by any group of
color. So I would argue that we have benefited the most under the
movement for, if not the policy of, affirmative action. This blurs the
altruistic and the self-interested nature of our arguments.
PROFESSOR MALAMUD: Let me end with Professor Chambers.20
PROFESSOR CHAMBERS: Let me just state one thing. I teach here
and, though I'm not named in the complaint, I consider myself one
of the defendants in this case. But since I'm not absolutely certain
how I feel about how to get to a good resolution to this suit, I will
say that I'm only mumbling for myself and I'm not mumbling for
anybody else.
As to your claim, Jack, that it is dangerous for us to emphasize
aspects other than diversity that motivate our program, I think sim-
ply that the Bakke case explicitly left open the possibility that Davis
might have defended itself by showing that its graduates not only
added to the numbers of Black or other minority persons in the pro-
fession, but provided service that was not otherwise likely to be
provided. So, likewise, we may want to try to show that. I do not
believe that this argument is yet foreclosed.
I agree with you that lots of us here would like to make this case
go away. We would like to make it go away because we do not
know for sure that the 6th Circuit or the United States Supreme
Court will permit us to continue any form of program that we con-
sider desirable. And I would love to know what you think could
make it go away.
I do understand that we may be on unsound ground in not
having included Asian Pacific Americans among the groups that we
include within our program, but you can be certain that the people
who are suing us would not be happy to settle the suit merely by
having us agree that we will continue our program as it is and sim-
ply add in Asian Americans.
Finally, I believe that this time around there will be no offer for
us to let the one person who is suing us into the law school and pay
the legal fees. How do we make this case go away?
120. David Chambers, Professor, University of Michigan Law School.
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PROFESSOR CHIN: You could default the case and litigate the in-
dividual class members who want to get in. Then you don't have
bad precedent. You don't have a 6th Circuit case that not only binds
the University of Michigan, but also everybody else in the 6th Cir-
cuit. You could-
PROFESSOR CHAMBERS: I think they've already moved to certify
a class.
PROFESSOR CHIN: They filed a class action, but only a certain
number of people who are in the class are going to insist on litiga-
tion. Some will opt out and you can litigate the individual claims of
the others.
You could make the individual named plaintiff an offer she
can't refuse. She at least has to be given an opportunity to accept it
or reject it. Once there's no named plaintiff, the class certification
goes away.
PROFESSOR CHAMBERS: The reason you thought that making a
concession down in Texas would have been sensible was that they
had already abandoned their program for something that was much
more defensible. Michigan would have a hard time doing that. We
might expand the range of groups that we include, as you pointed
out, but as you also said, on its face, our program is much more
Bakke-centered than the Texas program.
PROFESSOR CHIN: Well, the '92 program is, but there are certain
ways in which the school hasn't adhered, in my view, closely
enough to what that 1992 policy says. So I think you would be better
off having a plaintiff in a year when this bulletin wasn't in effect. But
instead of having a party admission, like this bulletin, that's appli-
cable to the admission year in which the person was applying, it
would be better to have a plaintiff who was an applicant to the class
of 1999 when the bulletin was clean. Then I might say, "This is as
good as you're going to get. This is the test case."
On the other hand, I still wonder how the history of the policy
is going to affect the case. You have 15 or more years of history
where Michigan had a policy that's really questionable. Is that going
to taint the case? Is that going to create the wrong atmosphere?
So even if you can say we're okay today, you still treated Bakke
as carte blanche for non-diverse and non-representative faculty to
create the world that they would like to see. And that, in some ways,
went too far.
PROFESSOR CHO: Aren't you presuming that it's about constitu-
tionality, though, Jack?
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PROFESSOR CHIN: How am I presuming?
PROFESSOR CHO: Aren't you presuming that the whole debate at
the Supreme Court level, at the level of litigation, is actually about
good faith constitutionality? Isn't Bakke really a set up, in that if
you're over-inclusive or if you're under-inclusive with regards to
Asian Pacific Americans you've run afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
121
If you're over-inclusive, that is, if you include APAs in your af-
firmative action plan, you run afoul of the second prong of the strict
scrutiny standard of review, narrow tailoring. If you're under-
inclusive, you are guilty of running a "racial spoils system" that
discriminates against APAs.
PROFESSOR CHIN: Well, I think it depends on the numbers. I
think if whatever group is the largest racial group in your school, if
you don't give them the same level of diversity preference or if you
give them no diversity preference then you don't have to worry
about narrowly tailored. But in principal, the principal is we're
looking for diversity, as much diversity as possible and whenever
any individual applicant adds incrementally to diversity, we're
going to take that into account. If you do that I think you're okay.
Now, that of course assumes that the Supreme Court would
uphold Bakke. And maybe they wouldn't, even in the ideal case, but
all I'm saying is that the case that goes up to test Bakke should be
the cleanest possible record, the best possible case, because if it's one
that's marginal, ambiguous, or seems problematic, then I think
they're going to hesitate to uphold it.
PROFESSOR CHO: I just think you're ignoring an unstated Faust-
ian bargain that was made in Bakke between conservatives and
liberals.122
PROFESSOR HSIEH: The more I try to work within Bakke, the more
I realize it's impossible to construct a meaningful, socially useful
policy from what Lewis F. Powell, Jr. thought in a single opinion.
I'm frustrated because one judge got to write the middle opinion
123
121. For an elaboration of this argument, see Sumi Cho, Supreme Stereotypes: Asian
Pacific Americans and Affirmative Action (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
122. I have developed this "bargain" analysis in Cho, Multiple Consciousness, supra
note 87, at 1050-51 (1997).
123. The Court divided both on the result and the rationale as follows: Justice
Powell delivered the judgment of the Court in an opinion in which Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun joined as to Parts I and V-C. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
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and therefore define the entire Supreme Court's equal protection
jurisprudence for a decade. That's a ridiculous starting point.
Moreover, he was thinking about Harvard, a very narrow context.
Now we're stuck with this list that's crabbed and that doesn't apply
to every situation.
PROFESSOR CHIN: But we've got no choice.
PROFESSOR HSIEH: I understand that. With my litigator hat on, I
say, "Yeah, I've got to make the argument. You're right, Jack." But
another part of me says, "What do I get? So I win this, I win Bakke,
but what does that get me?" It gets me more of the same-using
proxies to get to the kind of law school that's an appropriate,
meaningful, forward-looking, justice-producing-you know the list.
It gets me there if I say it's really "diverse," or if socioeconomic
status lets me sneak some in, if it gets me there at all.
Why can't we, at some level-setting aside the Constitution and
the nine Justices-why can't we just say, "Hey, a public law school
should be educating lawyers who will serve the state. It's a public
law school, and it's the responsibility of a public law school. We
have pressing needs for legal services for populations in this state,
and it's clear that bilingual lawyers, lawyers who understand the
community, lawyers who are willing to go into communities and
serve, are important."
I don't understand why, completely aside from affirmative ac-
tion and diversity, we can't somehow come up with a public school
that has as its public mission something that includes a statement
like that.14 The idea that we keep ignoring that just strikes me as
nonsensical. It's as if we are all Bakke babies, and we can only think
that way.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 267 (1978). Justice White joined Parts I, III-A, and V-C of Justice
Powell's opinion, and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting. Justices White, Marshall,
and Bl~ckmun each also filed separate opinions. Id. at 267-68. Justice Stevens con-
curred in the judgment in part, and dissented in part and filed an opinion joined by
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. Id. at 268.
124. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Affirming Affirmative Action, THE NEW YORK
REVIEW OF BOOKS, Oct. 22, 1998, at 91 (reviewing WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK,
THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS (1998)). I agree with Dworkin (and Bowen and Bok) that:
Elite education is a valuable and scarce resource, and though it is
available only to a very few students, it is paid for by the community
generally.... Universities and colleges therefore have public respon-
sibilities: they must choose goals to benefit a much wider community
than their own faculty and students.
Id. at 99.
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PROFESSOR MALAMUD: I can't possibly top that and I think that
the enforcers are going to shoot me if I don't end this session right
now. So why don't I do that right now and thank the panelists.
